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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
In the course of history, there have been many great 
military leaders. Each of these has been praised as well 
as criticized. One of the most controversial of these 
military figures was General Douglas MacArthur.! 
This controversial figure, at the outbreak of war in 
the Pacific, was placed in one of the most responsible 
positions of the war••Supreme Commander of the Allied Forces 
in the Southwest Pacific. The war in this area centered 
around the battle for the Philippine Islands. The battle 
for these islands was an epic of heroic fighting, great 
strategy, and much suffering. It was also marred by many 
discords and frictions. Theee disagreements produced high 
level errors which greatly affected the war in the Pacific. 
Douglas MacArthur, a man surrounded by many legends and 
beliefs, was the focus of some of these conflicts. 
It is difficult for people to speak of MacArthur in 
a neutral manner; they either have great admiration or 
great dislike for him. He is looked at in various ways by 
lGeorge c. Kenney, !!1!. cArthur.! !!!m!• (New York: 
Duell, Sloan, and Pearce, 1951 , p. 10. 
different people . Some speak of him with great adoration, 
while others describe hi s tremendous ego . 
2 
The purpose of this paper is to take a second look at 
the leadership of General Douglas MacArthur s ince the out-
break of World War II . In order to do this, it will be 
necessary to review the events in the general ' s career 
through World War II, during the occupation of Japan, and 
the war in Korea . This study will consider also the reason-
ing behind many of the decisions and movements made by 
General MacArthur . This will mean a study of the general's 
personal qualities and dominant c.haracter:J. s tics in order to 
gain insight into the behavior which influenced these moves. 
CHAPTER II 
BACKGROUND FOR LEADERSHIP 
General Douglas MacArthur was born at Fort Little 
Rock, Arkan as, on January 26, 1880, where his f thert 
Arthur MacArthur, wa · stationed. 1 
In his earliest years, Dougla$ wa attracted to the 
military. His earliest memories were of the sounds of 
guns and warriors t elling of heroic charges during the 
Civil War . 2 MacArthur stated that one of his. first memories 
was of a 300-mile march made to guard the fords of the Rio 
Grande fron1 the danger of raids from Geronimo's ma.raudit1g 
Indians . l 
At the age of sixteen, Douglas became a cadet at 
West Texas ~filita.:ry Academy at S n Antonio, Texas . His 
academic records were outs tandingJ and he was an all·round 
athlete. MaoArthu;r was a football hero; he was the key man 
on the 1896 team. 4 
1Fran~ie trevelyan Miller~ DouglfS MacArthur, ~isht~f 
~ ~Ieedg~, (Philadelphia: John C. Winston Co . ~ e . 1945), 
p . 31 . 
2Ibid. -
3Doug1a-s MacArthur, R,emi.niscencu, (New York: ~1cGraw .. 
Hill Book Company, c, 1964), p. 15. 
4 Miller, op. ci t ., p~ 36. 
Douglas MacArthur was appointed to West Point from 
Wisconsin at the age of eighteen. In 1898 hi s mother took 
him to Milwaukee to take the West Point examinations. He 
achieved first place in the examination.5 
4 
MacArthur entered Wes t Point on June 13, 1899, and 
began to rise rapidly . 6 He became a corporal in his second 
year, First Sergeant of Company A in his thir d , and First 
Captain of the Corps as a Firs t Classman . 7 On June 11, 
1903 , MacArthur g:r·adua ted as a second 1 ieutenant of Engineers. 
He s tated that the words of Elihu Root rang in his ears . 
Elihu Root said: 
Before you leave the Army, according t o 
a l l precedents in our his tory, you will 
be engaged in another war . It i s bound 
t o come, and will come. Prepare your 
country for that war . 8 
The first assignment given MacArthur was to the 
P~lippines. He was with the Third Battalion of Engineers 
on Guimaras Island . The main task was the clearing of the 
--')c"'lark Lee and Richard Henshel, Dou.Jll.l!! MacArthur , 
( fir s t edition; New York: Hen~y Holt and Company , c. 1952) , 
p . 29 . 
6 
Miller,~ · ci~., p . 54 . 
7 Lee, .22 . .£.!!. , p . 31. 
8MacArthm:- ' ~ cit~' p . _28 . 
5 
jungles in order to lay the foundations for civilization.9 
MacArthur was commended for his task here, and he later 
stated that it was here that he attained much knowledge of 
the Philippines which was to be very valuable later on. He 
stated: 
During my tour of a year I engaged in 
typical engineering duties in many parts 
of the islands. I worked on surveys at 
Tacloban, harbor improvements in Manila 
Bay, fortification installations off 
Corregidor, traveries over the steaming 
wooded hills of Bataan . lO 
Early in October of 1905, Douglas MacArthur was 
ordered to join his father as an observer in the Russo-
Japanese War. The Japanese armies had forced the Russians 
back until , after many months of combat, they stood at the 
gates of Mukden in Manchuria . It was here that the officer 
came under heavy fire with the Japanese troops. During this 
time, he learned much of the Japanese military tactics . 11 
MacArthur was suspicious of future Japanese movements . He 
later stated : 
• •• I had the uneasy feeling that the 
haughty feudalistic Samurai who were their 
leaders, were , through their victories, 
9tbid . -
10tbid. -
llMiller, ~ c::it., pp. 75·76. 
planting the seeds of eventual Japanese 
conquest of the Orient, ving conquered 
Korea and Formosa , it W&$ more than -evi-
dent that they would eventually s trike 
for control of th~ Pacific and domination 
of the Far Eas t.l 
6 
In the fall of 1906, t4acArthur w s ppointed ide-de-
camp to lTeSident 'Xh odore Roosevel.t, This appointment was 
of great interet to the young o·ficer because it was the 
first time h beccwe associated with a leading political. 
fi8ure . 13 
Dougla$ ~~cArthur's father seemed to be th controlling 
force in his life. Hi _- f ther ' s untimely death on June 2, 
1909 , was a crucial time for hirn. 14 Arthur MacArthu:r died 
while he wa spe king at th Fifteenth A niversary of the 
famous '1'-«enty li"ourth W:tscon in , which was composed of 90 
old Civil War Veteran • MacArthur te 1 of tbe cene nd 
the impact. 
In the middle of the room the Rever nd 
Paul B. Jenkins began to repeat the 
Lord t e I'r yer • . • tho e 90 old men ~rho 
cl follow~d him up Mi sio\1ary Ridge and 
into the bl~zing fire of d0zen b ttle-
fiel knelt by the ioe of their old 
cQlUl'Mln er and joined in. t-Jhen the prayer 
n ed, he was dead . The adjutant , 
Captain Edwin Par$ons 11 toot< from the wall 
__ 1.,..,l,...Ma~~·-c~Ar-· ·-th'!""'·ur ~ .2.2 ·' e ~~ . , p. 31. 
13Iptg. ' P• 33 • 
14 Mi ller , £2 · £!!. , p . 86 . 
the battle-torn fla g that he had so 
gallantly carried and t~apped it around 
the General. Captain Par on stood in 
silence for a moment , gazing at his 
de d commander , then fell fort-lard over 
the body and , within two week$$ passed 
on . My whole world changed that night . 
Never have I been able to heal the 
wound in my heart . l5 
Re lations be~een Mexico and America were rapidly 
deteriorating, and Mexican raiders began arres ting and 
molesting Americans legally on Mexican soil . On April 21 , 
1914, American sailor _ and m rines were sent to seize the 
city of Vera Cruz . l6 There were t hree locomotives behind 
Mexican lines t hat MacArthur thought should be captured . 
He also thought that the reconnaissance of the area would 
7 
be of value in case of war . MacArthur had a plan to do the 
j ob . DisguiMing1 himself as . a vagrant , he succeeded in 
penetrating the enemy lines and locating the e~gines at the 
risk of hi s life •17 lie had been warned that Washington did 
not want t-1ar, and that they might not lil<:e it. The young 
officer went ahead wi th the expedition and of its outcome 
he s tated: 
--,'3Ma.eAr thur , .212. . cit • , p • 3 • 
16Ibid . , p . 40 . 
11Mil1- - - - - .tt -5-- - er , ~ , ..£..±._. , p • • 
General Wood recommended me for the Medal 
of Honor . The War Department disagreed •. 
• • In decidi g to make the reconnaissance 
I may have been right or I may have been 
wrong. War did not materialize and the 
utility of our exploits would never be 
knm·m , but even my old frontier friends 
would h~v.e agreed that it was a wild 
night . : • . . I was promoted to major shortly 
after my return to Washington and again 
chosen for detail on the General Staff . 
Perhaps those gents in the WaS Department 
were no t so r ough after all.l 
When America en tered World War I, troops were needed 
in Europe as fas t a s possible . Secretary of War Newton D. 
Baker conceived of t he idea of forming a division from the 
National Guards composed of men from 48 states . 19 The 
General Staff had voted predominantly agains t thi s idea . 
MacArthur was for t he idea, believing that the Guard could 
be strengthened by volunt ary enlistments which could be 
trained to combat e ffectivene s s . 20 Secretary of War Baker 
and MacArthur took this idea to Pres ident Wils on , who went 
along with it . When they left the President , Baker a sked 
MacArthur what he considered t1e best method of carrying 
out the proposal . MacArthur stated, "I suggest that we 
take units from the different states so that a division 
18 I MacArthur, E.E. ~ ill·, 
1-9u"11 ,.,1. er , .9.R . cit • , p. 
pp . 42-43. 
95 . 
20MacArthur, _2E, ill· , P • 44 • 
8 
9 
would stretch over the t-~hole country like rainbow . " From 
that time on, this outfit was known as the inb~W.-~1Yi.sion..21 
Brigadier General Wi lliam A. Mann was selected to 
command the divi ion ~ with MacArthur a Chief of ·Staff . 
MacArthur took charge of organizing > training , and evaluating 
it . This command was part of the American Expeditionary 
Force under the command of General John J . Pershing . 22 
MacArthur tated that General ershing: 
•. • • r ose to the hi ghest flights of his 
profes ion . He inspired a self ... respect 
for our nati011al forces and a foreign 
reeognitior1 of our military might w ioh 
has properly ·placed ~s fully equal to 
the b s t of the 1uman race • My memorie 
of him sustained and strengthened me 
during many a lone ly and· bitter
2
mo ent 
of the Pacific and Korean War • 3 
Dougla MacArthur led the · en into battle at Bacarrot 
I 
and Reehicoutt in France, and was cited for gallantry after 
leading a large ssa.ul t . Me w s decorated by both France 
and Amer:f.ca on June 2 , 1918 , and wa promoted to the rank 
of Brigadier Generat. 24 
22T...,. • t 33 
,1.&1 ' .2e i E.!..: . ' p • • 
23 48 MacArthur, £?.£• cit ., p. , 
24Mille:r-, ~-cit . , p . 98 . 
10 
The Rainbow Divisiotl withst od large a saults ·at the 
Champagne-Marne Defensive . MacArthur' s t rategy was brought 
to the ttention of his uperiors, and he was placed in 
command of the Eighty-Fourth Brigade. He struck deci ive 
blows, and advanced to the M.eu e River in two days . When 
the Armistice was igned , he led hi men into Germany with 
the army of occupatiou .25 
There wa some critic ism of MacArthur's brea.king of 
certain regulations. It was said that e never carried a 
weapon or gas mas • HacArthu e~plai s that in thi way: 
• • • I wore no iron helmet becaufie it hurt 
my he d. I carried no gas mask because it 
ha pered my movments. I ~ut unarmed because 
it waa not my purpose to engage it .ersonal 
combat, but t:o d rect others. I 1sed 
riding crop out of long habit on the plains. 
I fought from the front ae l could not · 
.ffestively manipulate my troops from the 
rea:nZ6 
'l'hi· points to the general's way of pla.cin ·his own wants 
and judgme ts above those of his uperiors or army regula~ 
tions . 
had ·ought w 11, had been severly wounded, gassed 
26 cArthur, .2.2 ~ cit . , p . 70 . 
11 
t wice, and became noted as a daring leader. In 1918, he 
became totally blinded as a result of a mustard gas attack. 
MacArthur refused to go to the hospital and wore a blindfold 
for days . In a few days, his eyesight was restored. 27 In 
1919, he returned home .to cheering crowds; he fulfilled his 
own dictum, "Only t hose are fit to live who are not afraid 
to die . " 28 
Upon returning from Europe, MacArthur was appointed 
Superintendent of the United States Military Academy at West 
Point . The academy wa.s in bad shape . In fact , there was a 
question before Congress as t o whether t he United States 
would need West Point or Annapolis any longer . 29 
The job of reorganization was a delicate one, for 
there was opposition . MacArthur not only had trouble with 
Congress, but also with the tradition-minded professors who 
felt that he was an upstart . His success 't~as complete, for 
he constructed a new West Point in the spirit of the old one, 
bringing the curriculum to modern standards and increasing 
21Lee , EE • £!!., p . 35 . 
28Ipid . 
29Bob Considine , General Douglas MacArthur, (Greenwich, 
Connecticut : Fawcett Publications Inc . , c . 1964) , pp . 27-28~ 
the requ1rements.30 MacArthur stated: 
The highest tandards of honor were to be 
demanded as the only solid foundation of 
a military career--a code of individual 
conduct which would maintain the reput -
tion and well•being of the whole-~a 
personal responsibility to his mate , to 
his community, and above all to his 
country . In many businesses and pro-
fessions the welfare of the individual 
is the chief object, but in the military 
profession the safety and honor of the 
tate becomes paramount . In the final 
analysi · of the West Foi11t product, 
char cter i$ the most precious component . 31 
12 
In 1921, MacArthur reported to the War Department th t the 
Academy was faced with new demands. These demands had to do 
with the producing of effective officers 1n preparation for 
any future war,32 
In- 1925, MacArthur was chosen a member of the court~ 
marti 1 that convicted Brigadier General William B. Mitchell 
of in ubordin!ltion. lie referred to this task as none of the 
most distasteful orders 1 ever reeeived . "33 The charges 
30i'raz1er Hunt, Ma£Arthu:t" AUS! the war Agal'llst :J.f2!n, 
(New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1944)~ p. 8 • 
.. 3l:rr5iaArthur) .92, cit . ,; P• 60, 
32rrank Kelley and Cor.nelius Ryan, MacArthur, Man of 
~ctio.n, (Garden City, New York : Doubleday and Company, Inc . , 
19505, p . 86. 
33 - .---. 
MacArthur, ,5!2 11 Cl t . , p . 8S . 
13 
were made against Mitchell because he insisted on the develop-
ment of air power gain t order to stop from his superiors.34 
MacArthur stated: 
I was thoroughly in accord with the concept 
of the massive power of the air and that 
its development should he greatly accelerated 
•..• It 16 part of my military philosophy 
that a senior officer should not be s ilenced 
for being at variance with his superiors in 
rank and with accepted doctrine , l have 
always felt that the country's interest was 
paramount; and that when a ranking officer, 
out of purely patriotic ®tives, risks his 
own personal future :ln such opposi tion , he 
should not be summarily suppressed •••• The 
individual may be martyred, but his thoughts 
live on. , ... When the -verdict was reached, 
many believed I had betrayed my friend . • • • 
Nothing could be further from the truth. I 
did what l could in his behalf and ~ helped 
save him from dismissal, That he was wrong 
in the violence of hie language i s self-
evident; tha.t he was right in hie· !~esis is 
equally true and incontrovertible. 
On OetGber 30, 1930, Douglas ~cArthur was appointed 
Chief of Staff of the United States Army. Thi~_ appoin~ent 
made him, at 50 years of age, the youngest Chief of Staff 
in the history of the United States A:rmy. 36 
ll/ith this appointment, MacArthur made a tour of 
34tee", .2,2. ,e iJi. , p. 43 . 
3.5MacArtbur, .22, c;i,t,, PP• 85•86 . 
36 ~-
Considine, .22• cit., p. 36 . 
14 
Europe, meeting with the military leaders atad inspecting 
their armies. Upon hi return , MacArthur found himself in 
the mid t of a battle t-11 th Congre s over modernizing the 
Army.37 The general ppeared before Congressional committees 
time and again warning that the nation needed a sufficient 
army in order to rank high among the armie of the world .38 
National dissatisf ction began to grow due t ' the fact 
that million of people were out of work during the depres• 
sion. Many war veterans marched on Washington seeking to 
influence Congress to grant a ca•h bonus for veterans . The 
tension began to mount; there wa bloodshed and killing. 
MaoArthuxo, watching all this, stated: 
If the President gives me orders to act, 
I would not give this distasteful job to 
any other off:lcel:' of the United States Army. 
lfanything hould go wrong; it will be the 
kiss of death for that officer's future . 39 
When the order came, MacArthur mounted his horse, taking tt-uo 
officers with him: Major Dwight D. Eisenhower and Major 
George s . Patton . They broke up the encampment of marchers 
with tear gas and the flat side of sabera. 40 
-~7Milier~ .9.1?. • £ll., p . 123. 
38considine~ !2· £!!., pp . 39"40. 
39 . 
Lee, OE • E.!£.•, p . 56 . 
40 2 Miller, !2• cit ., p . 1 7. 
15 
Intimate friend told of how MacArthur went into the Bonus 
Army encampment t night and lent money to needy soldiers 
who fought with him in the American Exped tionary Forae .41 
The remainder of hi term a Chief of St ff wa spent 
trying to get Congress to do something about defenses . 
MacArthur s tates: 
1 stormed, begged , ranted. and roared; 1 
a~0st lick d the boots of certain gentle· 
men to g t funds for moto~ieatiGn and 
m c ni2 tion and air pow r . , • • 42 
What he w. 1 to $alvage wa · due only to backing 
given him by Pre$1dent Frankliu • Roo$evelt , who persuaded 
him to stay on for an additional year aft r his four year 
term had come tQ an e·nd. 4.3 
42MacArthur, J.e• c~t . • p , 99 . 
43Lee , tn.• t:it., P• 60 . 
CHAP'l'ER Ill 
MACARTHUR PREPARES THE PHILIPPINES FOR WAR 
\~1en Manuel uezon was elected Pre ident of the 
Phil i ppine Commonwealth, he asked MacArthur if he would come 
to Manila as mili tary advisor. Pr sid&nt Roosevelt gave his 
consent and MacArthur left f or th Philip ines in 193.5 to 
build an army. 1 
MacArthur d a bard j ob abe d of him . There was 
critic1 m, but he aingle-mindealy went on with his work . 
One section of the press charged that Pre ident Quezon was 
asking MacArthur to he lp him in setting up a dictatorship .. 2 
The Filipinos called him uthe Napoleon of Luzon." His s t y e 
and manner of addreaaing his soldier$ reminded one of 
Napoleon . The people of the Philippines referred to this 
S.$ "MacArthur ian -tyle ~· n3 
&mer l MacArthur felt that there was a race against 
- " Irrancis "T~evelyan Miller, ~o~gla~ M!~thut, FighteF 
for fieedom, (Phi lad lpbiai John c, Win,aton Company, 1945), 
P• 139 . 
2CatJ.o i'J P, Romulo, ! Sav-1 the f;dl , ~ the fhi\4PPipe,§, 
(New York: ,Doubleday, Doran, and Company , Inc ., 1943); p . 42. 
3~~l~t~'u §.~t-YJtign .!!! '-the !!1..&-~§st) He•ring• befot:~ 
the Committee on- Al:tued Services and _ the Committee on Foreign 
Relations, United States Senate, 82nd Congreaa, First Sesaio·n, 
(Wa hington: Government Printing Office, 1951), p. 223 , 
17 
time to build an army. He stated that the United S·tates had 
to build strong defenses on American islands in the Pacific 
as eoo11 as possible . There was SODle opposition in the 
United States and MacArthur pleaded: 
The Philippine Army repre ents one of the 
most heroic efforts a liberated people has 
ever made to maintain independence ·and 
national. ntegrity . It thre t n no one. 
It 1s ol · purpose is to preserve its 
country'a pe ce, it democratic principles 
and ita Chr:tltian faith. It deserve$ the 
complete aupport of public opinion in the 
Unf.ted States · nd wherever freedom is the 
guiding &pirit of men• livee.4 
cArthur said that h nwa · charged in high quartert w:tth 
being a warmonger and threatening the peace of the Far 
East . "5 
General MacArthur retired from the United States Army 
on Decembet: 31 , 1937, with the highest praise of President 
Roosevelt. He, with his family, took up permanent residence 
in Manila where he followed .the world situation with intense 
~ ... ·---··-· 
:tntere t , 6 
President Roo evelt had al o been l~atching the world 
4nouglas 'MacArthur, ~~i~~'f@nC~J , {New York: McGraw~ 
Hill Book Company, c . 1964), p . 145. 
5!h14· 
"Het:oes-·Me.cArthur , ' Time, 83 : 24 , April 10 , 1964. 
18 
s ituation. On July 26 , 1941, he sent a message to MacArthur 
ordering that the Philippin Army be mobi lized under his 
command. He was called back into active servic to command 
all armed forces of the Far Ea t . 7 MacArthur accep~9 the 
challenge: 
~ --·-·~ . 
I am glad to be able to serve my country 
at this crucial time . This ction of the 
American Goverum<:mt in establ is bing this 
net\' command can only mean that it intends 
to maint ain at any co t its full rights 
in the Far East . B 
The Pre ident authorized !<1aeAr t:hur to spend $10,000,000 
for initial expen e of mobilization and preparation . It was 
as though a rQprieve had come to a death sentence . There 
might still be time to build a defense agains t sudden 
Japanese invaaion . 9 Carlo Romulo stated: 
I t was evident that America was planning 
to show firm hand to Japan . MacArthur's 
appointment as Co1Dlll4nder .. 1n ... Chief of the 
United States Armed Forces in the Far East 
pointed to this . The evacuation of 
Amet:ican women, t he application of the 
arm embargo , ana the c ssation of the 
" . 71razier Hunt , cArthur ~ t he s Ag§tinst Japan , 
(New York: Cbarle$ Scribner ' s and S~ns, 1944), p . 2. 
8clark Lee and Richard· lien 'hel , p_pugl~.! MacArt~'ulr • 
First Edition ; ( ew York: l~nry Holt and Company , c . 1952), 
p . 135 . 
9 Hunt , n . cit • , p • 3 • 
sale of oil to Japan had been the first 
indicat ion • As a final blow10he United States froze Japane e credit. 
19 
The Philippine Commonwealth t d a plan ., developed by 
MacArthur, which contemplated a defense of the entire island 
area, but this was scheduled to go into effect in 1946 when 
the Philippines ecqu1red their independence.ll 
The general's prewar a sessment of the combat value 
of the Philippine Army was far higher tha·n ~1as warranted, and 
his mobilization and trainin ' schedule t-:'aS based on tbe 
belief that hostilities would not begin until pril of 
1942. 12 1~ said that by this time he would ve a trained 
army of about 200,000 men, a powerful airforce of 256 
bombers , a wel l a 195 pursuit planes. He fe l t that his 
great strength would assure the defensibility not only of 
the Philippineo, but the entire Southeast Pacific area . l 3 
By December 7, 1941, MacArthur had about 130 ,000 men 
in uniform , but nearly 100,000 of them were poorly equipped 
with only a few months training in clo eporder dri ll . The 
nr· omulo 0 .9.2· ill.· , p . 3 . 
11Hanson ·w. Baldwin, qrga§ M:i,S£§kes 9! the .. ttlar, (New 
York : Harpe:r and Brothers , . l 49) , p . 6 7. 1 
12J,l>i9~.~ , p i 68 . 
13John Toland, M ~ot in Shame, (New Yor k: Random 
House , Inc ., c . 1961) , p. 26. ' 
20 
men were willing and enthusiastic, but they could do little 
more than salute in the correct manner. Most of them hadn't 
even fired their old rifles. The airforce was in the worst 
shape; there were 277 planes, of which 35 were flying 
fortresses. There were only 107 P .. 40's which were modern 
combat craft . Nevertheless, MacArthur refused to be 
panicked , even though strange aircraft had been sighted four 
nights in a row . l4 
The general was compelled to await a move by the 
Japanese, as he stated: 
My orders from Washington were not to 
initiate hostilities against the Japanese 
under any circumstances . The first overt 
move in the Phi lippines must come from the 
enemy . There was apparently some hope 
that the somewhat indeterminate inter-
national poSition of the Commonwealth 
might: eliminate it from attack . This 
possibility had support not only from 
Quezon~ but from the American Chief of 
Staff, l5 
Therefore, MacArthur felt that he had to wait before putting 
plan "Rainbow Five'' into operation . This plan provided for 
offensive air operations in order to further the strategic 
Ilitbid. -
lSMacArthur, ~· cit ., p . 113 . 
defensive . 16 
MacArthur tateo: 
••• Whatever might come, we were as 
ready as we poss ibly could be in our 
inadequate defenses; on the night of 
December 7, every disposition had been 
made, every man, gun , and plane was on 
the alert,l7 
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General MacArthur was unaware of the two minor raids 
on the islands at Mindanao and Aparri. He was pos itive that 
the Philippines would soon be attaal~ed, though many Filipino 
authorities hoped that the Japanese l~uld consider them an 
i11dependet1t nati on and &.pare them. The general knew that if 
he made a wrong move now, his whole plan of local sel f -
defense might collapse . ln the back $f his mind he also 
remembered General Marshall's orders s uu: hostilities cannot 
be avoided, the United States desires that Japan commit the 
firs t over t act. ul8 
'" "16Baldwin, .212. • ,p!t . , p . 67. 
17M.acArt11.ur, .22• c& t . , p . 59 . 
18Toland • .21!• cit . , p . 59 . 
CHAF'l'ER IV 
MACARTHUR: THE DEFENDER OF THE PHILIPPINES 
MacArthur had ordered 11 flying fortresses around 
Manila to be flown to Davao Field on Mindanao f or safety from 
surprise attack . Only about half of them r~d gone by 
December 7, 1941, because room had to be left at the Mindanao 
base for more B·l7s 'tqhich were expected from Hawaii . Formos~m 
irfields war t o b bombed a a counter•att ck as soon as 
\Japan ei t her made or declared war , l 
( Tl;l.e report came tba t Luzon had been bombed; now there 
was no question about an .. over t act . " Far Eastern Air 
Commander Brereton phoned Ma::J.or General Richard I<. . Sutherla11d ~ 
!i 
MacArthur's Chief of Staff, about the attacks . Brereton said 
that "if Clark field is attacked, we won't be able to operate 
it. u He begged for permission to bOll\b Formosa, and it w s ..__ __ - ·-
fully authorized too late to hit Takao Harbor as planned . 
While Brereton 's staff planned new missions, the army bombe~s 
$ked permission to return to Clark Field . 2 
lsamuel Eliot Morison, The l!:9. Oc§a!l War, (Boston: 
Little, Brown, and Company, c . 1963), p . 80, 
2Jo1m Toland, But Not !!! Shame, (New York: Rand 
House, Inc ., c. 1961) a p . 61 . 
22 
There were sixteen flying fortresses at Clark Field 
lined up ready to fight. The thr e hangars were being 
camouflaged or repa1red. 3 The Japanese pilots were surpri ed 
that almost te11 hours afte:t· Pearl Harbor, every plane based 
at Clark wa a "sitting target." In one stroke the Japanese 
knocked out the Far East Ait Fo~ee at Clark Field.4 
The attack wa over almost as soon as it began . 
Gener~l Carlo Romulo described what happened: 
Our planes had b en caught lined up on 
the field in broad daylight . lt is true 
that they ba.d be n ordered to t ke off 
and remain cir cling in the air ~ They 
stayed up all morning until noon . Then 
the fl.yer l came down in perfect echelons 
and were lined up and waiting on the 
field when the Japane$e ripped down out 5 of tl~ skies with their great bombers • • • 
Of the planes p rk d on the runwsy, 11 but three 
flying fortresses lvere d stroyed . In one r aid the Japa·nese 
had eliminated in half a day two of America ' s defenses in 
Southeas t Asia: the Pacific Fleet and MacArthur 's air force . 
America had le rned too late what the le sons of war b1 
' 3 1h.!9.., P• 27. 
4Ioid . ~ p . 64 . 
s·carlos P. Romulo, ! .. ~ ·J:!!! ~alt ,.2! the Phil:tnet.nes, 
(New Y'lrk: DDubleday, Doran-~' aptJ. Company~, 1943), p. 23 . 
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Europe had taught-~that a heavy bomber force without adequate 
protection, air warning and anti-aircraft guns 1 helpless 
and useleas . 6 
If permission had been granted to launch an attack on 
Formosa in time 11 no great results could have been expected, 
for our strength ~;as too small and inexperienced~ and we had 
little accurate information concerning targets. On the 
other hand, it would have been far better to utilize our 
bombers in an offensive mission than to allow them to be 
caught as they were.7 
A controversy developed over the incident a.t Clark 
Field. Several stories were in conflict . MacArthur had 
one story, General Brereton bad another, and General 
Sutherland had till another. Several different accounts 
had to be consulted . s MacArthur never made a comprehensive 
explanation of this inoident ; but he s tated that General 
Brereton had suggested to General Sutherland an attack 
againat Formosa before the Clark Field attack on the morning 
· · · 6i'oia~d, .. .sm- .21£.., P· 10. 
7Hanson w. Baldwin , Great M stakes of the War, (New .................. ~ ... ~---,;.;,.;;:;,~;. - - -
York: Harper and Brothers, c . 1.949 , p. 70 . 
8Artb\l_t: Si}'blesinger JJ:.., wrhe Mysteries of B,taan," 
111e Report r, 10:37, February 2 , 1954 . 
of December 8 . 9 MacArthur also stated: 
• • • I know nothing of any interview td th 
Sutherland, and Brereton never at any time 
recommended or suggested an attack on 
Formosa to me . My first knowledge of it 
was in a newspaper d1 patch months later. 
Such a suggestion to the Chief of Staff 
mu t have been of a most nebulou and 
superficial c racter, as there was no 
record of it at headquarters. The pro-
posal, if intended seriously, should cerp 
tainly have been made to me in per on. t~ 
has never spoken of th matter to me either 
before or after the Clark Field attack ••• 
As a matter of fact, an attack on Formosa, 
with its heavy air ~oncentrations, would 
have been suicidal . 0 
General Brereton stated that the planes were on the 
24 
ground because of the long ix hour delay taken by MacArthur 's 
office to authoriz n attack on Formosa .11 
General George C. Kenney ; Commander of MacArthur 's air 
force in Au tralia, stated: 
Brereton • _ a.ecc!>\.mt of the vents of 
December 8# 1941 , show$ a state of con-
fusion and indeeision tha·t does not ound 
as though MacArthur had anything to do 
with the r~ndling of the air force that 
day , BTereton's contact with MacArthur 's 
Headquarters was General Richard K. 
Sutherland, the Chief of Staff, who 
- '9l)ougla. 'MacArthur , .Reini§CinQ.e§~ (New York: cGraw-
Hill Book Company, c. 1964), p . 120. 
10 l'bid . 
~
llschlesinger , .2.1?. • qi£ ., p. 38 , 
received recommendations for the use of 
the air force, and who often rendered 
decisions in the name of General 
MacArthur . l2 
There are others who seem to share General Kenney's 
25 
idea of the Clark Field incident. Samuel Eliot Morison, in 
trying to explain why Brereton, Sutherland, and MacArthur 
blamed one another, said that "the real trouble was bad 
blood between Sutherland and Brereton, of which, unfortu-
nately MacArthur seems to have been ignorant . "13 Hanson 
Baldwin, in his book Great Mis tal<es .2£ £h!l ru, suggests 
that General Sutherland may have taken it upon himself to 
refuse permission for the Formosa raid, though, at the 
same time, he blamed Brereton . 14 General MacArthur, who 
had an extreme loyalty to his staff, defended General 
Brereton: 
A number of statements have been made 
criticizing General Brereton, the impli~ 
cation being that through neglect or 
faulty judgment he failed to take proper 
security measures , resulting in the 
destruction of part of his air force on 
the ground •••• Such statements do an 
12George C. Kenney, The MacArthur I l<now , (Ne\v York: 
Due l l, Sloan, and Pearce, c.-1951), p . 83.-- ·~ .. 
l3samuel Eliot Morison , Strategy .!.!!! Compromise, 
( Boston~ tittle, Brown, at!d Company, c . 1958), p. 81. 
14Baldwin , .Q.E. · ill•, P· 71. 
injustice to this officer. His fighters 
were in the air to protect Clarl( Field , 
but \,rere outnumbered and failed to inter-
cept the enemy •••• 15 
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MacArthur had 11,500 miles of Philippine coastline to 
defend. He could not have his limited troops everywhere at 
once and was compelled to await a Japanese i nvasion . This ..,___ 
invasion finally came on the lOth and 27th of December, 1941 . 
They landed in force on the east coas t of Luzon. All in all , 
they moved more than 200,000 men against MacArthur's 
forces. 16 
In northwestern Luzon, MacArthur's forces were out -
numbered , incompletely equipped, lacking air support; and 
were only recently mobilized and organized into regimental 
greups . MacArthur felt that this left him no other alter-
native but to fight a delaying act i on . 'rnis was later 
I 
comp l icated by other landings in Luzon. 17 
Tension began to mount in the Philippines as another . 
landing was confirmed on the southern coast of Luzon . 
15MacArthur, 'l oc . cit . --
16Franl( Kelley and Cornelius Ryan , .MacArthur , ~ of 
Action, (New York : Dl:\'nbleday and Company, In..:- ., 1950) , p . 6 . 
17George C. Marshall , H. H. Arnold, and Ernest J . 
K.ing, The tvar Re.pQrt~ -..Q£.: · (Philadelphia and New Yor ~: J. B. 
Lippincott Company, c . 1947) , p . 76 . 
\ 
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MacArthur guessed thB.t. all these landings were minor 
probings ; therefore~ he held back, waiting for the main 
l anding which was bound to come . He s tated tha t "the basic 
principle of handling troops was to hold them intact until 
the enemy has committed itself in force . "18 MacArthur al so 
s tated: 
I kept a close watch on the l ow, sloping 
beach s of Lingayen Gulf, \oJh..ere I had 
stationed the 11th nd 21st Divisions of 
the Philippi Army at be ch defens s . 
In the deceptive quiet of the gray dawn 
of Decet her 22nd. the srea.t enemy blow 
fell t l as t: . A huge invasion f orce 
-ntered Lingayen Gulf • .• • The troops 
conveyed were • • • a tota l strength of 
approximately 80,000 combat troop • This 
was about twice my own strength on 
19 Luzon . • • . 
Though cArthur and other member of his s taff have 
tated that their force s were outnumbered by the Ja.panese , 
Loui Morton in hi book f~e all ~ ~ ~1}2E!n~s s t a tes 
tha t the defense forces on Luzon actual l y outnumbered the ~ 
invading Japanese by bout two to one . ZO MacArthur has \ W 
( 
beau known in the past t o have over e.stimated the s ize of ') 
"TB'Tol n · ~ .2.2 · £1...! · , • 104 . 
19MacArthur, EE• cit . , pp . 123~ 124 . 
20Loui Morton ThE! !!!.! £! ,the ].'h~.lJ.P .. attes, 
(\-Jas hington D. C. : Department of the Army, 1953) , p . 162 . 
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an invading force. 
MacArthur, realizing that this force was t he main 
division, rushed tanks to the north . He al so ordered 
General Brereton to collect every bo er in the area for a 
morning strike at Lingayen. Reach defenders were also 
warned to expect the gt ·ea t invasion. Brere ton 's air force 
could do very l ittl~ due t o the fact th t there were only 
a felv planes remaining . Deapi to heavy casual ties, the 
Japane$e pushed ashore and moved t o ard the north t o meet 
the f orce which had landed i n northern Luzon and were moving 
south do~m t he co st . 21 
l\'hen the Japane e opened hostilitie s , there was a 
convoy of seven ships, escorted by the Cruiser !~nS!~~l~ 
moving toward Manila carrying 
needed planes, ammuni ~lon 1 and suppU.es . The convoy was 
ordered back to ~waii, which was , in eff et , the abandon-
~ _ .... --.__..,..-.. ..-...,...,...._..__ -
ment of t:he Philipp:lne • Ge era ! Marshall hated to tell 
,, ___ ........ ...,....-.------·'~---_...... ... ~ ...... ---.-· ... ·-.. 
MacArthu that it had to turn back when it was needed so 
badly in the hilippines. A meeting of the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff decided to send the convoy to Brisbane in 
Australia, and then efforts would be tt'.ade to t ake it 011. to 
Manila. . cArthur coul see no ·rea en why this could not 
21Toland:· .22• cit . , pp . 112-113 . 
be done with reasonable nava l and air protection, and he 
discussed the matter with Admiral Hart.22 
The conference that MacArthur had with Admiral !~rt 
was not a happy one. These l~o men had been in conflict 
29 
ever ince MacArthur took command of the United States Army 
forces :i.n the Far East the previou$ July . Their differences 
worsened with the disa trous eventa of the first week in 
December of 1941. Hart disapproved of MacArthur's plan to 
bring the convoy to Manil by s tating that the Japanese 
would guess what they were doing and throw up a blockade 
around the Philippines before the aonvoy could leave 
Brisba.ne . 23 
MacArthur finally abandoned his trategy of holding 
at the beaches an considered plan formulated by his 
predecessors--War Plan Orange III, This plan called for a 
- -- --- ·-~-·-. 
slow withdrawal to tl~ Bataan Peninsula where a last-ditch 
defensive could be fought until the Navy could send rein-
forcements if po sibl • MacArthur had given up this earlier 
plan for he felt "it was defeatist move that might well 
- 'Z'X:Morton , .21?. · cit . , pp. 146-147. 
23toland, ~· cit . , p . 103 . 
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lose him t:he suppor t of the Filipinoa .. "24 
The chief reason for the order to wit draw was the 
failure of the troops to hold the enemy . Up until this time , 
MacArthur had had the grea test confi ence n the fight ng 
qualities of the reservists of the Philippine Army . ~sent 
word to Washington tha t he would remove his force under 
cover of darkness.25 
The withdrawal could easily v been crippled . Manila 
Bay ~as full of various types of craft shuttling men, 
munitions, and food to Corregidor and B t an . Highway three, 
leading from Man1la, was jammed with everything from trucks 
to ox carts. One bomb in the right spot c uld have destroyed 
the whole plan, but the Japanese flew over the evacuation 
and d:t.d not bomb it . 26 Maci-tt"thur stated: 
_.._......,. ___ -z 
The hazardous timing of this mov ment was 
it moat notable feature; on lip in the 
co-ordinated maneuver, and the motor 
colllmns f rolll southern Luzon o ld have 
b en cut off and cornered in Manila . The 
success of this operati n nabled the 
assembly and reorganizat ion on Bataan of 
the bulle f my orce , an madE! po s5.ble. 
the sub equent defense of the peninsula . 27 
}J~id .' p . 134. 
25Mor ton , Be• cit . , • l 3 . 
26 ola d , ~· c.it ., p. 146 . 
271-facAr t hur, QE.· ill· , p. 153 . 
31 
The biggest problem was food. There were 3,000 tons 
of canned meat and fish already stored on Bataan, and the 
rest was on its way by water, rail, and highway. The 
question was how long the road to Bataan could be kept 
open.28 
In order to give time to prepare defenses on Bataan 
and to permit an orderly withdrawal of men and supplies, 
Wainwright was to hold back the Japanese along five lines.29 
The object was to hold only long enough to force the enemy 
to prepare for an organized attack, delaying them long 
enough to reaeh Bataan intact. But it was soon evident that 
Wainwright, with his poorly trained and equipped troops, 
could not hold out till January 8, as planned; he was worried 
about holding out til the first.JO 
In Manila everything was chaotic. Military installa• 
tions were in a state of confusion as personnel were hastily 
loaded into trucks, cars, and busees. Earlier that after-
noon, orders had been given to ret~eat to Bataan Peninsula. 
The explanation now was that Manila had been declared an 
28toland • .1m.. cit. , p. 146. 
29MOrton, ~· ~., p. 165. 
30to land • loc. .£!!. 
... 
open city to save it from greater bombing. 31 MacArthur 
s tated: 
Manila, because of the previous evacuation 
of our forces, no longer had any practical 
mi litary v lue. The entrance to Manila 
Bay was completely covered by Corregidor 
and Bataan ; as long as we held them, its 
use would be denied t 1e enemy . He mi~ht 
have the bottle, but I had the cork.3 
\.vhen the govern.ment and the army had left the city, 
there was a feeling of f oreboding and terror. The exodus 
32 
f:t·om the city, which had cea ed after tbe f irs t war scare, 
began all over agai 1. 33 
The Japanese had complete ly misunderstood the mass 
migration . They believed that t his w a frantic f l ight of 
certain eleu~nt of the Philippine Army. The Japanese felt 
that if they concentrated on the capital, the campai gn would 
be over once it was t ken . They thought that MacArthur 
could probably hold on Bataan a few .weeks., o they ignored 
the migration disappe ring i nto the Bat aan jungles ana 
concentrated on Manila .34 
3lib1d. P~ 138 , --
32MacA thur, o • cit ., p . ' l.53. 
33Morton , o • £4~ . , p . 234 . 
34roland, ~· Qit ; , pp . 156·157 . 
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The retreat to Bataan had been carried out safely 
under harrowing conditions . Wainwright had lost 12,000 
men and had had many de ertions in his delaying fight . 
MacAlrthur now had 15,000 Americans and 65,000 Filipinos in 
Bataan . Although 10,000 were professional soldiers , the 
remainder was a group of untrained men • This \vas the force 
which was to hold so long. Their greatest asset was the 
mountains and jungle of the rugged Bataan terrain .35 
Radio Tokyo ackn&wledged the receipt of MacArthur ' s 
"open city" declaration, but the Japanese in the Philippines 
were either unaware of it or ignored it . They had flown 
over the mass evacuation and were bombing Manila , on 
December 27 , 1941, as though the major force was located 
there . 36 
During the final days on Bataan ; MacArthur and 
President Quezon sent many messages to Washington begging 
for help that never came , help which could not have come 
except for a trickle of supplies by submarine . T\ey were 
sent only encou'ragement, when they really needed b\illets, 




MacArthur was up et by what he referred to as 
.. defeatism," and wired General Marshall that "if the Pacific 
is to be saved it will h ve to be saved here and now. u He 
begged officials in Washington to recon ider their strategy 
because if the Filipinos discovered they had been abandoned 
by the United States, everything would collapse . The 
general aid that if the Philippines could be saved, it 
would justify " the diversion here of tb.e entire output of 
air and other resources" by the United States . 38 
Efforts to tran$mit any supplies to Corregidor had 
failed because of 4 rigid enemy bloet<ade . At least fifteen 
blockade runners gere sunk or captured by the enemy while 
attempting to get supplies through to Bataan . Several over ... 
age destroy rs were also fitted as blockade r unners, but 
none of these succeeded in reaching the Philippines prior 
to the fall of Corregidor . J9 
Corregidor was n island that aat in the mouth of 
Manila Bay, easily visible from Manila on a clear day . The 
holder of Corregido:: controlled Manila Bay. The island wa 
les than two and one half miles from Bat:aan. which was to 
38!oland~ .22• c;f.t . t PP• 103-104. 
39Mar hall, .22• _ill., p. 78. 
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become the main battlefield on the Philippines . The rock, 
or Corregidor, was de igned perfectly for defense, for here 
in rock and l4'ell hidden were the fort's big guns , On the 
island there was a hump of solid rock; this was called 
t-ia. lint:a Hill, In the hill was bored a gre· t tunnel in which 
10,000 men could live without fear of bombing . This tunnel 
wa to be MacArthur • headquarters . The general and his 
family lived in a small cottage half a mile beyond the 
eastern mouth of the tunnel.40 
MacArthur made a trip out to speak to the general 
officers of tvainwright and Parker in ox-der to whip up the 
spirits of the tired defenders . 41 The general carried an 
Help ie on the way from the United States , 
Thousands of t roops and undreds of planes 
are being dispatched . • , ,No further 
retreat is po ible . We have mor.e troops 
in Bataan than the Japane$e have thrown 
against u$) our supplie . are ample; a 
determined defense will defeat the enemy ' s 
attack. , • • 1 call upon every soldier in 
Bataan to fight in his a&signed pos ition, 
resisting enemy attack. 'thi$ is the only 
road to salvation. If we fight , we will 42 win , if we retreat , we will be destroyed , 
~OT~land~ i!• oit . , pp . 103·104 . 
41 
I !?i,,, P• 179 . 
42Ibie • ............... .. 
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Many of the American noncoms openly jeered at the general's 
optimism and others $uffered disappointment later on . The 
great majority of the Filipinos took these words as hope and 
inspiration .43 On the whole, the general was not a great 
inspiration to many men during this time, because he rarely 
vi ited Bataan ,44 
On January 22, General Sutberland returned to 
Corregidor from Bataan describing the situation s so alarm-
ing that an immediate l-1ithdrawal waa necessary . MacArthur 
agreed, and, on January 23 , ordered a general retreat to the 
.. '"' 
last line . Thi was a line which cArthur s id was well 
prepar ed .,45 
When this line wa reached-. General MacArthur ordered 
the retre ting men to att ck nd rea t ore t heir liues. They 
were now IDQ.nning the Abucay Line which exten ed from Pilac 
to Boyac . Thi& line ~a Stronger though the men were weak , 
hungry, and tired aft r th long retreat . The retreat had 
ended and the Japanese, thinking it was about over, attacked 
Mac-Arthur ' s flanks from the China Se side . Th:t was almost 
Zi31bid., p 180. 
44Baldwf.n; £!E. • cit. , pp . 63 ... 64 . 
4'»ob Con .idine ~ .~ep~r~t po':!.!l§~ MacArthur . (Greenwich, 
Connecticut: Fawcett Publication · , Inc . , c . 19 4) , p . 186 . 
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a fatal move on the part of the Japane et for they landed on 
five polnts of land on the west cQast . No troops could be 
tJpared from MacArthur's front line to face them, but eome-
where the needed men w re formed f~om a group here or part 
of a company there~ These makeshift forces held the 
Japanese on these points, preventing them from coming in the 
46 rear of the general' front lines, 
The general's situation was desperate. The futility 
of the meager efforts Washington was making was accented by 
70 tons of mmunition brought in by the l~~nt . Greater 
amounts of supplies were nee.ded and MacA;'thur continued to 
tvarn W abington that it was a fatal mis take to continue 
their present policy. He believed that the 2,000 mile 
Japanese line of communication~ hould be attacked instead 
of concentrating on the building up Qf force$ in Australia , 
Th general said that there was one way to defeat Japan: 
"seek combat, not avoid it."'47 
Many of the men on Corregidor held en to their hope 
to the last d y. They did not know or believe that only a 
little while after eeember 8, 1941, the decision had been 
~UClark Lee, Th~J! 9R-~lll r..tJ.£1fis;; (Ne't'l York: The 
Viking E'ress~ l943l~ pp .. 192-193 . 
47Tol nd:~ .!?.2. • sJS ·, p . 205 , 
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made in Wa hington that the Philippine could not be rein• 
forced, and that MacArthur and his men would have to do the 
b t with what they had , 48 
Brigadier General Dwight D, Ei enhawe~, who had pent 
four years as MaeArtiur•s enior military as stant, was 
called upon to give an opinion by General Marshall. 
Ei .·enhower, after pondering the que t:ton, reali~ed that 
reinforcements could only be sent to the Philippines when 
the Navy was rehabilitated . The only · olution , thought 
Eisenhower• was to .. set up Au ·tralia as a ba e fo~ offensive 
operation • ''49 It t<1ould have been hard for men suffering on 
Bataan to accept this decision .50 cAtthur describes the 
situation: 
· Our ttoop were 11ow approaching exbaus tion . 
The guerrilla movement was going well, but 
on Bataan and Corregidor the clouds were 
gro~1ing darker. My he :t~t aehed as I saw 
,my man lowly wasting away . Their ·clothes 
buns on them like tatt red rag • Their 
bar$ feet stuel( out :tn s:l.l$nt protes,t . 
Their long bedraggled hair framed gaunt 
bloodless f~ces . 5l 
liS ' Lee , a. 2 ;1. ~ • , p • 240 • 
49Toland , ~· e~t ., P• 107. 
50tee, .21?.• ft.!i. , p . 193 • 
51MaeArthur, .22• cit,, p . 1359 
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President Quezon became increa ingly anxious about the 
situation and sent the following me . aage to MacArthur who 
forwarded it to Washington : 
This war is ·no t of our making • • • we 
decided tc fight by your ide and l~ve 
done the best we could and we are till 
doing as m.uch as could be e~peated from 
us under the circu ·tance • But how long 
are we going to be left lon ? Has it 
already been decided i n Washingtm1 that 
the Philippine front iS of no importance 
a far a th fitlal result of the war is 
concerned nd tha.t, therefore~ no help 
c n be ex ected ·· re in tl~ immediate 
future; or t le st before the powe:rr of 
resi'ltanee i B xhausted? ·• . • .lt seems 
that W hington does not fully realize 
ours· tu titn1 nor · the feeling which the 
apparent neglect to our , afety and wel· 
fare have eng ndered i~2the hear t$ of the people her . • • • • 
Quezon became more nd more i~~atient a no real 
efforts were being de to · enforce the Philippine • H$ 
went to MacArthur propos i ng that he a k resident Roosevel t 
to grant immediate independence to the Philippines . Then 
the islands v1ould be neutralized and would no longer be a 
battleground . Gen ral MacArthur fon1arded thi& message to 
Washington along with a report of his own . uezon had 
written a bitter mes.sage &aying that 11thet"e was no denyb1g 
that we are neat:ly done,~· and also added that the Filipino 
40 
attitude was one of "almost violent resentment agains t the 
United State . u53 
President Rooseve l t sent a per onal me sage to Quezon 
which repudiated the idea ·of independence and declared that 
the United States Government would never agree to this type 
of oluticn . The Pre ident expressed his sympathy for the 
Philippine people and pledged .American upport no matt er 
what happened t o the present force. Roosevel t added that 
the United States " ~ •• shall not re.lax our efforts until 
the fore s now mat"Shalling out ide the Philippine Islands 
return to the Philippine . and drive the la$t ·remnant of 
the invaders from your soil, u.54 
General l~cArthur received the following message from 
Preeident Roosevel t in anst~er t o his a king for instr uctions: 
I therefo~e give you thi mos t difficult 
mi ion in ful l under .tanding of the 
deepel:'a.te situation to which you may be 
shortly reduced •••• Ma e your re istance 
a effective • • • and as prolon ed a 
humanly po ible •••• You; yourself, 
however; tn\tSt determi e a~§ ion to be taken 
in view of circumstances . 
The geneX'al, reading between the lines, now knew that 
·-s3Toland, .9.2· .ill· , PP . 213 .. 214 . 
54Mo_rtont SE.• 9.&~·, PP• 354 ... 3__55 . 
5.5 Kelley . £2' Sj!. , P• 116 . 
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the Philippines were to be used as a symbol of resis tance to 
the last . He replied to Roosevelt: 
I have not the slightest intention in the 
world of surrendering cr capitulating the 
Filipino force of my command . I intend 
to fight to de truetion on Bataan and 
then do the sam on Col'regidor . 56 
Hanson Baldwin, in his book Great Mistal<:es of t he m, 
stated that i t t-1as ha;rd to u1tderstand how MacArthur could 
radio Wa$hington givi g tacit approval of Pre ident Quezon 's 
me saga te Pre ident Ro0sevelt only "twenty f our days after 
promis ing his men that thou and of reinforcement and 
hundreds , of plane$ ~1ere on th~ way. n57 eArthur , on the 
other hand, had explained that 11 uch c t:ion was necessary 
t o concentrate immedi te attention or it would be too 
late . "58 
Thera were bitt er rumors of a Washington ell out on 
Corregidor . Some of the officers r emembered that Generals 
Mar$ 11 and ~mcArthur we~e , not on good personal terms 
because Marshall still blam d cArthur f or not making him 
a general when the latter wa Chief of Staff ~ It was 
""SiiQcAt- thur ) .22. e:l. t . • p , 139 • 
51 Baldwin, • cit, .,, p . 75 . 
58M.ac.AJ: thur , IS~ · cit . 
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feared that Roosevelt and Marshall would let MacArthur rot 
in the Philipp:f.nes . 59 
The men on Bataan at fir t be lieved the optimistic 
reports from MacArthur's Headquarter$ , but they later des-
paired . It was here that the "Dugout Doug" stories s tarted . 
Front line troopers were griping about those on Corregidor 
who lived in Comfort . 60 
MacArth1r had spent most of his time on Corregidor 
and he might not have completely realized the great shortage 
of food on the fighting front . Later, when Wainwright t ook 
command, he found the men on Corregidor better fed than 
those on Bataan.61 
Hanson Baldwin. stated that the "Dugout Doug" stories 
which started on Corregidor, were extremely unfair . They 
cast unwarranted reflections upon ~~cArthur's personal 
courage, which was outstanding . In two world wars he had 
always demons trated a calm and exemplary bravery . 62 
During the latter part of February of 194l,, General 
59Toland, £2• cit . , p. 210 . 
oibid . , p, 291. 
61schlesinger , ~· £!! . , p. 38 . 
62Baldwin, ££·cit . , p. 73. 
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MacArthur was ordered to Austr li • The gene:ral thought 
that an abrupt dep r ture might result in "collapse in the 
Philippine area, " nd he asked tG delay hi . departure unti l 
the 11psycholog:lcal time,"63 MacArthur added~ 
• • • The e people ar depending upon me 
now. • , and any i dea that might d$ve lop 
in their mind that I wa being withdrawn 
for any other purpo e than to bring them 64 immediate relief ceuld not be explain d. • • 
General Marshall granted MacAr hur this delay in departure. 
The "psycho logical t:· · " came ix days later on lt"ebruary 24 .65 
o evelt knew that General MacArthu1:' 
I ' I 
withdr awal would have important reactions, and, at a news 
conference held on March 17, 1942, made the fol lmqi ng 
s t atement: 
j I 
• , • There it~J going to be Axis pro ... 
g nda that will . ppea~ this fternoon 
on theilt hort w ·v • and tomorrow 
. rn:tng, ab . ut t,low th~a ab-~ndo-.;unent of 
\ 
the Philippine · is nothing more than 
another Van ook .\ring to get o~t of 
Java, et eetera . nd of cour e we kpow 
what they will ay. On the other ide 
of the picture; put it thi way, he will 
be more useful in oupr .. e command of th~ 
whol . Sot1thwest Pacific than :tf he tayed 
. o!Itforton , .2B.• ci_t . , p . 357 . 
64~b~d~, p . 358 . 
65lki&.· 
on Bataan Peninsula, where of course the 
66 fighting is going on. • • • 
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The War Department made Jonathan Wainwright Commander• 
in•Chief of all forces in the Philippines, promoting him to 
lieutenant general in March of 1942. The problem which 
Wainwright had to face immediately was the lack of food . 67 
It wa April 1, 1942, that the Japanese att eked 
in force.68 The Bataan force held out for eight days and then 
it was over. It t-1as not long until Correg:ldor also surren-
dered . MacArthur wrote of Corregidor: 
Corregidor needs no comment from me . It 
h&s sounded its own story at the mouth 
of its guns . lt has scrolled its own 
epitaph on enemy tablets. But through 
the bloody haze of its last reverberating 
shot, I shall always seem to see a vision 
of grim, gaunt, ghastly men; still 
unafraid.69 
To determine the reasons why Bataan fell, MacArthur's 
whole Philippine record has to ~e taken into consideration . 
(;6From Franklin D. Roosevelt News Conference , March 17, 
1942, in Samuel I . Rosenman (Ed .) , ~he Pub~ic Pape:ra!! 
Franklin R· Roosevelt, (New York: Harper and Brother s , 1942), 
vol., P• 110. · 
67Jonathan M. Wain~Tight, General Wainwright's Story, 
(New York:. Doubleday and Gompany, tnc . , 1946), p . 67 . 
68J,ee, !£• cit., p. 195 . 
69}facArthur, 12£. £.!!·• 
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The general was over-optimistic in thinking that the i lands 
were :impregnable . In the early months of 1941 , MacArthur 
had stated that the Japane e had overspent them elve ~ and 
felt that there was uo rea on to fear he Ja anese until 
April of 1942 . 70 
Bataan al o fell beeause of the Ja anase trength and 
the laclc of reinforcement f or MacArthur 1 a fore • These 
force s were ill due to a hortage of food and supplie 71 • 
The general dem nded suppli·s, but t re were rea on ·hy 
these could not be ent. Pre id nt Roos v lt , in his 
Fires ide ·Chat to t e people of Americ~ ort •ebruary 23 , 1942 ~ 
$tated that: 
It is t~1t complete ncirclem nt: , l-1it 
control of the air by J panese land .. ba · ed 
a ircra ft, •lhich • pr eve te u from 
aendin• eJub tantia.l rei fQrce ts of men 
and material t o the ga llant def nders &f 
the Philippines . • • , 72 
Loodng back on th sit ation, General Carlo 1? . Romulo 
10Artl1u~-Schle$f.nge-r Jr . ~ · "The Mysteries of Bataan," 
T,.h~ ~Rqrte~, 10:37, Febt·uary 2, 1954 . 
71Ibid., p . 36. -
72From Franklin Roo .evelt' Fire ide Ohat, .February 23 , 
1942 , in Samuel I . Rosenman (eeL ) , Tb~ b~l!'r Papt;ra !! 
Jf.£ankl~:q Q • .!\2,osevelt, New Yorlo Harpet: and Brother , 1942 
va l . , P.• 110 . 
states: 
In our trap on the Rock we could not know 
of the tremendou off n 1ve America ~a 
concentrating in Europe, I rshall and 
Ei enhower needed all-out upport over 
them. Enemy submarine wer concentra t ng 
on the floor of the Atlantic . America 's 
fleet had een de~troyed at Pearl rbor . 
Wa hington wa desperately buildin up 
Amex-iea'tf defenses nd Gffensive where 
th y were needed most . America could not 
spread it~ offensive aero a two oceans . 
The Pacific problem would have to wait .73 
There wa also much fr . ction which gre't-1 during the 
Bataan fighting an the iege of Corregi or betwee·n the 
46 
br nches of the service as well a$ old per onal jealou ies . 74 
All of these things played an imp rtant part in the battle 
and f 11 of the_ Philippines . 
73ca:rlos l? . mulo , 1 ~§.l!s~s! H~I<h J~~Q§.f. , (New Yorlo 
Alfred A. l<nopf, 19 3), p . 11 . 
74Baldwin, £2 ~ s!!·, p . 72. 
CHAPTER V 
THE. AUSTRALIAN COMMAND 
When MacArthur left Corregidor in March, he thought 
that in Australia he would find men, guns, and planes which 
he needed to make a counter-attack on the Philippines or at 
1 ast on the Japanei~Je somewhere in the Southwest. faci:fic •1 
The general was given a hero 's welcome when he arrived 
in Darwin, but was a.hecked to find out how few troops we:t:e 
waiting for him there . Inatead of finding a great American 
force a&sembled~ he found Australia in danger of being 
another Bataan , 2 MacArthur atatea1 
The immediate and imperative problem which 
confronted me was the defE!nse of Australia 
itaelf. Ita actual military situation had 
become alm0st desperate • Its fo_!~t-were._, 
. W.~@~ .. tQ .. _In.~ ~~t?;-~me _ ~nd Jap nese invas.ion 
was momentarily expected, The bulk of its 
ground troops we~e in the Middle East, 
while the United States had only oue 
division p~esent, and that but partial ly 
trained. Its air for_~e .~~ .... ~<JJ!~PP-e.ci with 
almost ob~olete P.l4ttEUL.an«l was lacl<:tng 
not only in engines. and spare parts, but 
in personnel. It@ n,!lV.Y->.-hac;l .nQ car_rielis 
or battleehips~ the outlook was bleak.3 
lClartc LGe, Tbe_x Call j! Pacific, (New Yorlo The 
Vik~n Press, 1943), P• 23. 
2lb~_g.' p . 160. 
3nouglas MacArthur, Reminiscences, (New York: McGraw ... 
Hill Book Company, c. 1964), P• 145. 
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The force wa not large enough for MacArthur to return 
to the Philippines. The best he could do was to get together 
those few plane '"~hieh he had and send them on that last raid 
on Corregidor and ataan ,4 
MacArthur received a message from General Mar hall 
telling him t h t due to the seriousness of the war in other 
areas, there would be a definite limit on what he could 
expect . This meant that the immedi te rescue of the 
Philippines would have to wait . t4acArthur proposed that 
Russia open second front against Japan . When all of his 
propo als were brushed aside, he became convinced that he 
wa opposed by a powerful group of enemies in Washington 
whose considerat ions had been influenced by hatred of him. 5 
In an interv:l.ew t-7i th Bert Andrews of th !!ll! Ygrk 
~rald Tl:ibune on November 22 , 1944, MacArthur criticized 
Washington ' • support of the Pacific War. The general stated 
that: 
' Zi 
• • • the Pacific war had been starved in 
the :l.ntere t s of Europe • • • that if he 
had been given a portion of the f0rce which 
invaded North Africa, he could have retaken 
the Philippines in t~ee months because at 
that time the Japane•e were not ready . • • • 
We nutde the same old mi&take of intervening 
Lee, .22• V..!•, p . 286. 
5lbid . ' p . 161. 
in European quarrels which we can't hope 
to solve becau e they are insoluble. He 
said that Europe is a dying system. • • • 
that the history of the world would be 
written in the Pacific for the next 10,000 
years •••• 6 
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The general appears to have been trildng back at Washington 
for neglecting hitn nd brushing away his proposals. In his 
own mind , he eemed to be striking at powerful enemies who 
were trying to ruin him. 
The ~~~~t Chiefs had appointed ~e~thur Suprem~ 
CQmllU.inder of the Sout;:hwest: facifie, Admiral Wil liam F. Halsey 
Commander of the South Pacific, and Admiral Che.ster Nimitz 
Commander of the Central Pacific. 1 There wa some concern 
that this type of command might cause friction. Admiral 
Halsey stated: 
I emphasize Supreme CO'ra!.Uander to establish 
the realization that MacArthur and 1 
commande~ everything in our respective 
areas ..... army, navy, marines, a.nd allies; 
troops, ships, planee, and supplies .... · -
Thi$ was my first experience with a 
cempoeite command, and 1 was determined 
that our job should not be slowed by 
interaervice friction. I need not have 
6aeport by Bert Andrews, ~~w l9U H§!rald T;!bune, from 
MacArthur to Forre8tal, 194!•, in Waltet" Millis (e~d .),!!:!!! 
'QU§§tf!l Diarie~, (New Yor.ks The Viking Press, MacMillan 
Company, l9Sl), PP• 17·18, 
7w:tlliam F, Halaey, Adm!tral J.talfex.' s §J:orx, (New York: 
Whittlesey Hou e, McGtaw ... Hill Book Company, Inc_, e. 1947); 
p . 138. 
worried. • • • 8 
Sometimes the problem of one commander overstepping 
another•s command occurred, as this entry in the diary of 
Secretary of the Navy Forrestal testifies: 
• • • Vice Admiral Kinkaid has in hi 
forces under MacArthur six old battle-
ships . Two of the e need to be sent 
back for repair . Nimitz made this 
suggestion but had to get MacArthur's 
agreement . MacArthur desires to hold 
them and has so stated. In exercising 
his perogatives of command, if he insists 
on thia order, he will in a sen e be 
overstepping into the broad authority 
of Fleet Admiral Nimitz. The units 
MacArthur needs to accomplish his 
objectives • • • are obviously a thing 
of vital interest to him , but the deter-
mination of when s ips , eed overhaul or 
may be necessary for other operations is 
obvious~y the interest of • • • Admiral 
Nimitz . 
50 
On the othelt' hand~ MacArthur spokesmen had frequently 
stated that their chief was being slighted on material an4 
jurisdiction and might be forced to t alc:e a back seat to 
Admiral Nimitz and others . 10 
8lbid . -
9Entry in the iary of James B, Forrestal, 1943 , in 
~alter Millis (ed.), 'file Forresta} DiaJ:ie , (Net\1 York: The 
Viking Press, MacMillan Company, 1951), p . 26 . 
lOJo eph Driscoll, .f'cifio Victory, (New York: J , B. 




Early in 1942, the Japanese had gained a foothold at 
Lae, Salamaua. and Finschhafen; t his was strengthened by 
J the construction of a chain of sir and staging bases to the 
west at Madang, Wewak, Hollandia ., and to the Indies . They 
decided to move down the coast to the Buna~Gona area in 
Papua , where they set up a base and continued a drive over-
land to Port Moresby.ll 
The concept in Australi seemed to be one of pass ive 
defense . General MacArthur felt that this could only end 
in defeat . The general s tated: 
I decided to • • .. move the thousand mi l es 
forl.,.ard into eastern Papua, and to stop 
the Japanese on tne rough mountains of the 
Owen Stanley Range of New Guinea- ... to make 
th fight for Aus tralia beyond its own 
borders. If successful, this would save 
Australia from invasion and give me the 
opportunity to pass from defense to 
offensive~ to seize the initiative , move 
forward, and attack.12 
MacArthur was able to launch his offensive in 
September of 1942, due to the arrival of a division of 
American troops, w:lth the holding of the enemy in check 
outside Port Moresby. The gener 1 h d long ince m.art(ed 
' 
liFrank o. Hough ,. The i s land !if!. , .(Philadelphia and 
New Yor~: J , B. Lippincott Company, c . 1947), p . 91~ 
12Mac.Arthur, .2.2• .£!!, , p. 152. 
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the Milne Bay area as a probable Japanes= landing point, and 
as early as June he had moved in a strong force of Australian 
troops, keeping them well under concealment . The Japanese 
force 't>~hich landed here wa counterattacked before they 
could dig in, and were wiped out i n a week of fighting . 
Fighter plane fr.om the Port Moresby strip provided cover 
for an increasing number of bombers flown over from ai~fields 
in Australia. The e bombers made heavy raids on supply 
dumps in the Buna~Gona region which was cutting the enemy 
facing Port More by off from food and ammunition . They soon 
began to retreat as Austral ian and Amer:i.can forces pressed 
them back. 13 
• • • he Jap nese troop , , severed from 
all reinforcements, their leaders lost 
in action or by suicide, their bodies 
worn with starvation and sicl<nelU , and 
their morale shattered by the unrelent~ 
ing blowe of their attackers, were 
fina.lly forced to yield their positions. 
On January 2, 1943 1 the Buna Mission 
f 11; Sanan nda followed, and on January 
22nd, the apua Campaign L after siK 
months ~f bitter, a asel ss struggl 
ended . 1 
Thus for the fir · t time in World War II , .Mat;:Arthur 
I3Fletcher Pratt, War fer the li<>rl4t (New Haven, Yale 
University Press, c~ 1950): P• 75. 
14MacA:rthur, .!2• c; t .-, p . 165. 
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took the offensive by land, sea, and air. This offensive 
was small, but it was the most _ fmportant news to come out of 
MacArthur's Headquarters in a long time . This was the first 
big air-borne troop t ran porting job taken on by the United 
States in a theater of operations . lS 
The Japanese began to strengthen garrisons at Lae and 
Salamaua on Huon Gulf after defeats at Buna and Gona. This 
was to be MacArthur's next objective . A convoy was sighted 
on March 1, 1943, heading to reinforce Lae. General Kenney, 
MacArthur's air chief, now readied his American-Royal 
Australian Air Force in Papua., and attcking the convoy 
accomplished one of the most devasting air attacks on ships 
of the entire war with the exception of Pearl Harbor . l6 
The Joint Chiefs of Staff developed a plan in May of 
1943, which called for the unconditional surrender of Japan . 
This woul d require a large supply base. The plan called for 
the taking of island b ses which could be used as "stepping 
stone • .. Admir 1 Ninlitz was to conduct opet'ation~ through 
Japanese held island , while General MacArthur was to proceed 
IS"Toward a Japless Net-1 Guinea , u Time , 40:31, 
November 16, 1 42> p . 31 . 
16 amuel Eliot Morison, H! .._.t;;or,x ,2! .Y.!l!ted ~a~es Naval 
Operations in World War 11,, (Boston: Little , Brown, and 
Comp ny, l9Zi7), p . 272. -
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northwest along the ew Guinea coast.l7 
MacArthur stated that "ground , air, and sea operations 
. 
were thoroughly co-ordinated," and that "it was a new type 
of campaign--three dimen ional warfare--the triphibious 
concept . nl8 
General MacArthur and Admir 1 Hal ey agreed that the 
first step of the drive was to reduce Rabaul . Rabaul was 
the center of things in the South Pacific . If Japan could 
be denied the use of Rabaul, Mac~thur could drive up the 
New Guinea coast with his s award flank and secure this base, 
The Central Pacific assault could then begin without fear of 
Rabaul's bombers. To get Rabaul a base was needed in the 
norther n Solomons . MacArthur and l~lsey agreed on 
Bougainvil.le •19 
In order to win the Huon Peninsula, MacArthur landed 
a force at Nassau Bay, which lie eleven miles south of 
Salama.ua. This t~as a town located on the south s ide of the 
• "17M.' HBnlon Cannon, Leyte: T1:1e Retul;'n to the 
P.Jt~l~.R!;in~.!, (Washington D. C.: Department of the Army, 
1954)' p . 2 . 
18MacArthur, .22• .£iS• ,. pp . 16.5~166 .. 
19Robert Leckie, §t:~ong _n ~to;g, (New York: andmn 
House Inc . , e . 1962), p . 159 . 
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Markham River . In order to isol~te Salamaua , the general 
took Lae. Once he had done this, its occupation would cut 
the supply line of Salamaua . On September 4, the general 
landed an Australian regiment east of Lae, and on the next 
day, an American pa achute regiment was dropped to gr~b the 
airfield of Nadzab, 19 m les northwest of Lae . 20 
General cArt:httr' e forces, sup or·ted by the Seventh 
Fleet , seeur d Papua, Admiral 1 e1 was able to take an 
airfield in Bougainville from whe:re the irforae could bomb 
Rabaut,21 
In .both parallel op~r tion$ , cArthur and Halsey 
used a strategy called "leap- frogging . ' The idea of this 
was to by~pa$S tle trong islands nd land amphibious forces 
where there w~re relatively few Jap nese troops. Here they 
would 'build an airfield and, along wi h llied na-val 
supremacy, eould cut off the by•pa ·ed islands . 22 
Ma~Arthur tated: 
It was practical applicat ion of this type 
·-'- 2u~ ·. r~c·; Fuller~ I~t - §ec91J51 rr~51o ~.x 1 39·1945 , 
(Lonclont Eyre and Spottiswoode·, 1 48 p . 198. 
21samuel Elia . or" s~n,, .!L!..!.SX .:._g 9om2~om~s.e ~ 
(Boston: Little, ro~m, and Comp ny, e- 19585, p . 92 . 
22 \ lbid . ,p. 93. 
of warfare .... to avoid the fro·ntal ttack 
with its terrible loss of life~ to by-
pass Japanese strong- points and neutralize 
them by cutting their lines of supply; to 
isolate their armies and starve them from 
the battlef1eld; to, as \~illie Keeler u ed 
to say, ''hit 'em where they ain•t"- .. tha.t 
from thi time forwa~d guided my movements 
and operations . Thi decision enabled me 
to accomplish the concept of the dire~t­
target approach from Papu to Manila. 3 
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The "isl nd hopping" could have taken years, a.ceording 
to Samuel Eliot Morison, but MacArthur's idea of uleap-
frogging" changed this . Before he died General Tojo told 
MacArthur that "leapfrogging" t'las one of the three principal 
factors that def ated Japan.24 
Japanese counter-strategy was to f rtify a new 
defensive p ri eter from Saipan through Tru and the 
Bismarcks to imor. Th ir p1rpose ~as t o delay and wear 
down the kneriean and Australian offensives, ma intain the 
East Indian fronti r vdth strong ground forces, and to get 
ready to catch ·h United States Pacific Fleet off guard . 25 
The tr tegic posit "on in th fall of 1943 in the 
·~ 23t1ac.Arthur, .22• cit., P- 166 . 
24samuel Eliot Mori on, ~ '1.1-10 P9e;,.!! !!~.I ,. (Boston: 
Little, Brown, and C pany, ~· l 63}, p . 282. 
25s~suel E~1.ot MQrison, St,~a~.egy Jtnd <f_omg;romis~, 
(Bostou: L:~..ttle , Brown , nd C,ompa.ny, c . 1958}, p . 93 . 
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Southwest Pacific was this: MacArthur 's Australian-American 
forces had ecured eastern New Guinea and were prepar ing to 
invade the Bi smarc s. In two years of fighting, the United 
States had yet to take any land which h d been t alen from us 
or one of our l lie. .ince the war began . 26 
The trat gi c le dershi of General MacArthur along 
with the energy of his air commander, General George Kenney , 
combined to prod ce a most effect. ve a i T.- ro1nd partnership . 
~fac.Arthur 1 s trate gy 't-78.S t o use 1 nd .. ba ed plan .s to cover 
leap.s up the New Guin.ea coa.s t and into the Philippines. The 
Army got its leap covered, and the ir force got island 
bases from whi.eh t:o ga1.n air upremaey· and advance to where 
its bombers co ld get a t Japa .27 
MacArthur, at the age of 64. wa$ as air-minded as the 
younge t pilot . He ha learned a. great lesson of the air 
age . He had le rned that 1t was poor $tr tegy to needlessly 
expose t t ·oop ot: ships to an enemy with air supremacy . Wewak 
waa a s trong baSe; and instead of immediate invaeion, 
MacArthur had Kenney sen a contingent of his air force to 
Z0Hougii", .212.• £!_., p . 125. 
27Kent ~· ert Greenf eld , rica.n S;tt:~q;e,gJ: ,in Woli~d 
War .U• A. , ggcpns i~§!r.a;ot,to:n, (Baltimore1 The John • s Hopkins 
Press, 1963), p. 111, 
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make ra.ids on the ba e . 28 
Rabaul had always been the mai n obj ective of Operation 
Wa t chtOl<ler, and it was a shock to MacArth r wllen Genet.>al 
Marshall ugges ted that he leapfrog Rabaul in t ead of a sault• 
ing it . Rabaul's ubs ti tute wa to be Kavieng in New Ireland 
and Manus in the A.dmir 1 tie • The great l eap, coupled later 
with a decision to bypass Kavieng as well. proved to be 
for tunate . There were still close to tOO 000 defenders 
under. a tough and resourceful gener 1 on baul . Since it 
had been a stockpil1ng baee for var1ou · inva ions which 
never came off , the Japanese garrison had plenty of weapons ~ 
ammunition, and upplies . This le p th t isolated Rabaul 
was made by MacArthur w! th a reconnai s nee force . The 
general t hought that a f orce of tbi size \'74 attge enough 
to make a brisk retr at if the enemy wa there in s trength. 
The general dec ided to let this force re :t.n and to rein--
force them quickly. cArthuT, fr hi$ knowledge of 
Japanese ground tactic , rightly pr edicted t hat the enemy 
woul d co 1it his army piecemeal, and that each mall group 
could be defeated . 29 
- 2Bsamu l .. EU.ot Mori "on, ~P!. ~ Oc.:1a.n J1ar, (Boetont 
Littl , B~own ~ and Company , c , 1963), p. 291 . 
29 ° !2-ts· , p . 294 . 
I I 
MacArthur tated: 
Rel,ba.ul was being steadily emascul .ated . 
Enemy thrusts f rom that o ee•powerful 
tronghold w re b coming v.<ea ~ and 
ineffectual~ and by t e end of February , 
1 · l~4, had no :ir supperrt whatso vet- . In 
pite of replacements and r inforcements , 
the once .. p -w rful pane e ir fore in 
this area had been defeated almost to the 
point of extinction . 30 , 
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· With R.abaul eal d off, Mac rt 1ur • s ·nex move wa to 
le pfrog the strong Japanese force at \~ewat< into Hollandia, 
whet:e he would at up ne 1 advanc~ he dquart:er • · General 
Kenney had b en king massive a.ir assaults, which had 
almost knocked out Hollandi as an enemy air base .. There 
l-18 not one enemy plane wh eh rose ·rom the five tar get 
fields to intercept ca~rier-based bomber . 31 
On the night of Apri l 21, 1944, cr isers and desttoyers 
began fir it g the pre l minary bombar nt, and after do.wn • the 
latter day, landing forces moved in ag inst the b aches of 
Aita.pe and Hollandia . This ~1as proe ded by intense fire fl.!'om 
roc~et• un boats. Resistance wa light in both places. By 
Ap1:il 23, all the airfield$ were in American hands and our 
-· 30M8cArt:htlr, .!m. · cit., p . 181. 
3-ls m~ 1 liot Morison~ ';rh't 1'!.2 Oc ..!11 W · , · ~Boston: 
Little, lb;_own1 an9 Oo~pany, c~ , 1963); P· 294~ · 
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fighters were being set up on Aitape air strip . 32 
Hollandia was the crucial move in the Pacific; this 
move w • as important to the end in New Guinea as Leyte was 
to the conquest of the Philippines. The Japanese were 
caught off guard and resistance soon faded . MacArthur joined 
the inv aion force , for he wished to $et up a major base at 
this point . The Americana were able to captu~e some valuable 
supplies at Holland1a, for the Japanese had uaed it s a 
upply depot . Aa the forces mov d inland resistance was 
tougher, but by August of 1~44, the conquest of the northern 
coatt of New Guinea was eompleted. 33 
General MacArthur needed no· ul!'ging to push weetward 
rapidly along the coalt of New Guinea. He had already out· 
lined to his staff a series of a$taul . - which pointed toward 
Mindanao by November 1.5 , 1944 .,34 
It had been the general's intention to proceed by a 
aeries of nvelopm nta up the eoaet of New Guinea and :lnto 
the Philippines . By this time, he had superiority of the sea 
and air . This enabled MacArthur to land hi a force a where the 
32Pratt, .!.2• e~t . , p . 269~ 
33tbid, . PP • 269•270. 
34 Samuel El :lot Mor:Lton, The Two_ Ocean Wa;r , (Boston: 
Little , Brown, and Company. c . 1963); p, 319 . 
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Japanese were the weakest and confine their stronger forces 
to areas in which the Japanese were caught in pockets from 
which they could never break out. Thi resulted ·in ·hundreds 
of thousands of Japanese troops being isolated in Pacific 
jungles at the time of urrender . 3S 
In little more than three montha, MacArthur advanced 
550 milei from Hollandia to Cape Sanea.por . He had acquired 
three big Jap ne ·e air baeeas Hollandia , Wakcle, and Bial , 
which he picked up enroute and a fourth, Wewak was leap• 
frogged . 36 
These reault8 bad been achieved through expert 
planning and great teamwork between the Army, Navy , and Air• 
fo¥ce of the United Stat a and Australia, but as Samuel 
Eliot Morilon has stated: "It i s questionable w·hether they 
could hav '. been attained under any other commander but 
MaoA:rthur . Th<»ae who served under him , in ttThat:ever arm of 
the aervice or from whatever country, greatly respected 
tl 
his military judgment and leadership . Hie operation• wer e 
smartly executed, and took place 0n or close to the set 
35~orge c. )~~shall, H. H. Arnold, and Erne•t J. King , 
The War Repo!(tf, ,eg: Forwarded \)y Walte't Millia. (Phila6elphia 
and New Ytn-tu :,. B .. Lippinc~tt Company, e , 1947) • .p . 220. 
36siunue1 Eliot Morison, Ih!! Two Qc~an !!t• (Bo•ton: 
Little, Brown, and Company, c ., 1963) • P• 322. · 
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I • 
target dates -vJi t h very few snarls . 37 
Ti e genera l had reason to move fast; he was imbued 
wi t a burning determination to return to t he Phi lippines 
and avenge t he humi liating defeats which the Americans had 
suffered in 1941 and 1942 . There was also the obligation 
. ·--· --~ --
of the United States to the Filipino people , and this could 
not be ignored . 38 
MacArthur fe lt t hat Hollandia would give him a jumping 
off place for Mindanao , the southernmost island of t he 
Plilippines, where he was sure there would be substantia l 
Philippine support . 39 The general sent t he fo llowing to the 
Joint Chiefs : 
It is my opinion that purely mi litary 
considerations demand the re occupa tion 
of t he Philippines in order to cut t he 
enemy ' s communications to t he south 
and secure a. base for our further 
advance •• , . Moreover, if t he Uni ted 
States should de liber ately bypass the 
Philippines, leaving our prisoners , 
nationals, and loyal Filipinos in enemy 
hands wi t hout an effor t to retrieve them 
at t he ear l iest moment, we woul d have 
the gravest psychological reaction ••• 40 
37Ibid . 
38cannon , ~· £!!., p . 2. 
39Joseph Driscoll, The Pac ific Vic tory--1945 , ( New 
York : J . B. Lippincott Company , c . 1944), p . 21. 




General Mar:thall cautioned cArthur to "be careful 
not to let per onal feelings and Philippine polities" over• 
ride the great objective, which was to end thew r . He also 
pointed out that "bypa ing" was not the same a abandon .. 
ment . 41 
General MacArthur '\laS invited by General Marshall to 
attend a conference at Pearl Harbor in order to confer with 
) Admiral Nimitz on future pl ns for the war in the Pacific . 
When he arrived, the general found President Roosevelt, who 
invited the officers to dinner , took out a map, pointed to 
Leyte and said, uwell Douglas, wheJ:e do we go from her e?"42 
The Navy propo•ed a move going directly into Formosa 
from Sa1pan and Mindanao; bypassing the Philippines . 
MacArthur wa1 Still intent on liberating the Philippines and 
ueing Luzc~m for the pringboard to Japan . 43 
General MacArthur, as he later explained it, made a 
strong emotional argument: 
, • • M:tlital:ily, I felt that if I could 
secure the Philippine$, it would enable 
u1 to clamp an air and naval blockade on 
the flow \of all aupplies frOTQ the south 
41&biq .• 
42~bid., P+ 5. 
43samuel Eliot Morison, S~r&tesx ,mW Comero.mi•e; 
(Boston: Little, Bltown, and Company, c, 1958), p. 98. 
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to Japan, and thu , by p ralyzing her 
indu trie$, foTc her to early c pitula-
t ion • •• • 1 felt that Formo a, with a 
hoat:Ue population, might prove doubtful 
to serv'e as a base for attack against 
Japan itaelf. I was aleo eritieal of 
what 1 rega~ded as a jor blunder in 
originally abandoning all effort to 
relieve the Philippines, •• ,. It wa not 
only a moral obligation to relea e this 
f riendly pQSBeS ion ft:om the enemy • • • 
but that- to fail to do •o ~ould not be 
understandable to the Ot;:tental mind . 
Not to do Ot lllot'eovtu:, "t<;rt;;uld result in 
the eath of thoulands of pr:i.so11ers·, 
inelu 1nf American women, children, and 
men eivi 1ana, held in ~ilipp1ne con-
centration camps • • • • 4 
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lt was finally decided not to bypal the Philippine$ , 
but to suppo~t MacArthur's inva4ion of the islands by way 
of Mindanao . There tfaS also, at the emne time, to be a 
vigorous advance by the fleet tow~rd either Formosa o~ 
I 
Lu~on . The Pre . ident app~oved the· e plan and it looked 
like the Navy and MaeAltthur would be working together in 
ha~ony in the Paeifie . ~eArthur app;oved and said that 
be would change hi · plana. accordingly. 45 
Ther.e seemed to be no strong di agreetn.en t be tween 
General MacArthur and AdmiTal N1~1t~. Admiral Leahy ltatedt 
44Mac'Arthur • .2!• c:t~ . ~ pp . 197·198. 
' ' 
45-w.illiam ». ~·ahy , l WJS IJ;let:_e • {_N$w Yolik: Whittle8e}l' 
House, MeGraw-Hill Book :OOJ;tlPI!lny, lne., c . 1950), p. 230 . 
I pers$nally w convinced that they 
together we~e the beet qualifi .d offie rs 
in out" service for thiS tremendous ta I<; 
and they could work tdgether in full 
a~eement toward the common end of 
def ating J p n . 46 
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There were othea1$ who favo~eci the Philippines firlt 
lao. Samuel Eliot Morison atated that Formosa '1\qould have 
been a difficult island upon which to obtain a lodgntent, 11 
be¢ause "it · stepping tone to the m.ainlancl of Japan would 
not have materiali~ed. aince by that time Japan firmly con• 
' 
t"1'olled the entire eoaat of China. •t47 Admiral Leahy f,tated 
that "from a pu:trely atr tegical point of viet~, I lvae in 
favor of the Philipp:t·ne operation. n4S Admit: 1 Halsey felt 
that 1 t watt neeeesuy ancl profitable to go into the 
Philippine , fo:r he conaidered them to b uthe vulnet:able 
belly of the Imperial Jb:agon. n49 Genetta.l Wedem.eye1!' s tated 
that the move to the Philippin s would "iaed:i.ately C'$Ut the 
enemy liuet from Japan to hia conquered territory to the 
$()U tbwatd • 1 tS0 
.... . 'l46tbld ,' \ 
- \ 
47&unuel Eliot ~rison, 1i!itt~'l-5~ID' .!U.4 S.~e~o,mie~\; 
(Boston: Little, Bro~ , and .Company, c, 1958), P•' .§9. \ 
• \ • 1 
4SIJeahy • a~ £~1= ·, p ~ 229. \ . 
----
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The Joint Chiefs of Staff concluded that none of thele 
currently Selected objective · could be by•p s , ed . They. 
therefore, continued to find a meal\ by '~hieh the war in the 
I 
Pacific might be .tepped up.Sl 
· . "51 cannon, .loe . ill. 
I 
CHAPTER VI 
THE RECONQUEST OF THE PRILIFPINES 
The purpose of the Leyte Cam.pa:tgn waa to e tabliah an 
air and logi t ical ba e i n the Leyte area in order to 
suppo~t ope~ation 1n t he Luzon••Formosa-·China coaat area 
and part icularly t o nullify Japane e . trength on Luzon. It 
wa · hoped that th yt$ Valley could be u ed for major air• 
field&J and base s:tte from which large ... acale operations could 
be launched again$t the re$t of the Philippin s . l 
The Joint Chief$ orde1:ed Gener 1 Ma.cArth~:r _to. prepare 
plans for a t'etur n t o Mindanao, eut her.mnoat i land of the 
Philippine , tori t h a target dat e of November 15 t 1944 . On 
June 15, MacArthur i s ued a pla for the r .etak:tng cf the 
Philippines.2 MacArthur tated: 
~ ·y plan , called ~-~!eno,tt was based on the 
prem:Uie that the P lllppine Archipelago, 
lying dir. ctly in the main tea routes 
from Japan to the source fbf hel' raw 
materials and oil in the Netherland 
lndie , Malaya, and Indo China; was the 
most strat egic Gbjective in the South-
west Faeifie area . Whoever ~ontrolled 
the air and naval bales itt the Philippine 
lsl. u\s l o i cally control l d the main 
-r'-· _1M, 'iaUlon C~nnon , !6xtze; I\1! i;;urn se, the P)l~l~RPil.te•, 
(l-1a hil-tgtc>n D, C.: Dep tment .o f the y , l954),p. 1 , 
2Ib1d., p. 2 . 
artery of supply to J pan •a factol;'iee ••• 
• "Reno" enabled our ,fore to depart from 
a baae eloteat to the obj. ctive , and 
advance against the most lightly ~rganized 
poa:tt:t.on of the enemy'a defenses, effect .. 
ing a deci ive penetr tion •••• Initi 1 
lodgment wel:' to be effected in southern 
Mindanao on Noveml:>er lS j and . t Leyte Gulf 
on Decem er 20th. • • • 
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The major effort of this operation was to be an 
amphibioua landing with force• mounted from New Guinea for 
th taking of bate · on Leyte. Leyte would then b made into 
an excellent apringboa;r;d from which ta launch later attaek$ 
against the Japanese in Formosa 01: in the reat of the 
Ph11:1ppinee.4 
t~hen the Joint Chiefs. ask d MacAl:thur and Nimitz 
their opinions on advancing the target date& by by-pa8sing 
any presently aeleeted objective - , the commanders were in 
agr ement. They both stated that it: wat imposaible unless 
eertain conditions ehangecl. Gen tal MaeAwthur added that 
bypas ·· :tng any objeetivea before the seizure of Formo•a was 
not practical . An ttack against Formoea would have no 
land•ba$ed ir support, fer they were baaed on Hawaii 5 ,100 
milea away. He felt :tt wa$ necessary to take Luzon and le t 
'3ii'outi'ias MacArthur, ~§,min~ s;!.nc,es, (Net! Yor~; McGtta'tf• 
Hill Book· C0mpany, 1964), PP~- 210•211" 
4 I I ' 
Cannon , .21!. s.!.r· , p . · ~ • 
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up land-based aircraft first.s 
As plans stood, General MacArthur would continue his 
advance along western New Guinea, Truk was to be neutralized 
by fast carrier strikes, the Mariana were to be occupied by 
Central Pacific force starting June 15, and Mindanao was to 
be taken by MacArthur, supported by the Pacific Fleet , in 
November of 1944.6 
Early in 1942, General MacArthur's headquarters began 
to receive messages from guerrilla forces in the Philippines . 
Recognition was slow at first, for the general wasn't sure 
that they were from the guerrillas . By August, he had tried 
to get in touch 'tr7ith members of the movement . Two radios 
were set up, and the e furnished MacArthur information on 
Japanese activities in the area . As a result , the ge11era.l 
was able to piece together a fairly good picture of Japanese 
strength , disposition$, and fortifications on Leyte . They 
were not only a great help in intelligence, but bolstered 
the morale~ spirit, and loyalty of the Filipino people . 7 
On Augu t 31, 1944, General MacArthur issued his firs t 
5 Ibid. , p • 3 • \ 
6samuel Eliot MOrison, Strategx and Comnr omise , 
(Boston : Little, Brown; and Company , c . 1958) , p . 97 . 
7cannon, ~· £!!., pp . 18, 20 . 
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formal directive covering proj ect d operation in the area of 
t he Philippines. Th Leyte oper tion wa to be known as King 
'· 
II. The force of tl Sout st P e ifi c wer to capture area . 
on Mindan o , yte, and amar in or er to set up air, n val. 
and logi tic bases to cover later Philippines operations. 8 
On September llt Admiral Bull Halsey, di covering t he 
we knes of Japanese ir power in the Philippines, ugge ted 
that all the Palau, Yap, Morot 1, nd Mindanao 1 ndi g be 
called off in favor of an immedi t thrust on Leyte .9 
Hal ey conferred with MacArthur and sent message$ to 
Admir 1 Nimitz and the .Joint Chie f s, recommending t hat a 
j int assault be e on Leyt o October 20, two m t hs 
ahe d of chedule . The J-o-in t Chief concurred . 10 
G neral Marst~ll received a a ge from · cAt· thur 
which d monstr""t d notabl~ &cr . tte gic flexibility; "Subject 
to c~mpl tion of arrangem nts with Nimitz, we shall execute 
Leyte Oper tion on 20 Octob 
'-. 
• • .M$cArthur .. "11 
Btbici:-;-p . 23 . 
9Rob rt Leclie, StrQ~S en A£ffi,9 , (New York: Random 
Hou e, Inc . , c . 1962), p . 394 . 
10 amuel Eliot ri on, t ,.at,egx .!J. -2. pro!!-! , 
(Bos ton:. Little, rown, nd Comp~my, c . 1958) , P• 102 . 
llcannon, Jm• <!-tt •, p . 9 . 
In early October, MacAr hur • m:tlit ry forces at1d 
Admiral. Kinl<ai "s S v nth Fleet began to concentrate at 
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Manu , Holl. dia., an other plac alo.ug the New Guine Coast . 
On October 10, the North ard mov ntent ·egm: , and by October -----
18, all _.t~ i lands con· nd:lng the entrances to Leyt-e Gulf 
ha~_ be n secured by ranger .12 
The Joint C ief s directed Admiral Nimitz to suppor t 
MacArth r' operation again t Leyte. Admiral Ni mitz ordered 
Admiral Hal y's Third Fleet o "destroy enemy naval and a.ir 
forces in or threat ning the Philippin area . "13 
Three we ~ before the gre t naval a ttle a t Leyte, 
October 14, 1944, t1e Joint C i e fo decided t o liberate Lazon 
and Manila as ·neral cArthur had 4lraya w ted. Fo os 
was r j eeted on pr ctical ounc1s . It was decided that i f 
the landing on Leyte went wel l, the five divi i on u ed here 
in reserve would b r eady f o a s~con mphib1ous operation 
before the en of 1944 . Landin s at L n ay n ulf in 
nor.thern Luzon wer put on t1e progr for c ber of 1944 . 14 
12's~uelEliot rison , Th~ J:Jl.S Ocean Nar . (Boston: 
~ '">:J~ 
Little, Brown, and Company , e .• 1963), p . ·433 . 
l3c nn • ~- c!t . , p . 30 . 
14Samu 1 Eliot ~ris9n , . $~~BtSBI ~~q ~ 2r2m1~e , 
(Boston: t ttle, Brown , and Company c . 1~58), pp . 111-112. 
MacArthur tated: 
1 had no illus.ion about the oper t1on.. I 
knew it wa to be the crucial battle of 
the wa:a: in the Pacific . On ita outcome 
would dep nd the fate of the Philippines 
and the future of the war against Japan .• 
Leyte was to be the anvil g inst which 
I hoped to hamme:t> the Japanese into sub-
mis ion b1 the central .Ph:J.lipp1nes- ... the 
pringboard from which 1 could proceed 
to the conquest of Luzon~ for the fin 1 
as ault against Japan itself •• • .• 15 
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MacArthur gave G ner 1 Kenn y' ir force its mission. 
Thi mission wa to make aerial reconnaissance, co-ordinate 
with carrier•baaed aircraft to neutr lize hostile forces in 
range of the islands, to protect convoys, and to destroy 
Japanese shipping and installations in tl~ area . 16 
MacArthur stat d that the ground operations .would be 
itt four phases: 
••• Phase one covered minor preliminary 
landings to secure small ,.eland lying 
cross th entranoe to Leyte Gulf . Phase 
two ineluded the main ttm.phibious as aults 
on Leyte fJ:"om Dulag to Tacloban, and 
called for the seizure o£ the irstrip, 
an advanc through Leyte V lley, and the 
opening of San Juanico and Panaon Straits .• 
The third p se con isted of the necessary 
overland and shore•to•shore oper tiona to 
co plete the capture of Leyte and the 
sei2ure of southern Samar. Phase fC)ur 
lSMaeArthur, !2• cit . , p . 212 . 
l 6cannon, R!• ~&~ . , p. 27 . 
contemplated the occupation of the remainder 
of Samar and the further neutralization of 
enemy positions in the Visayas . l7 
During the night of October 19-20, d~stroyers near 
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the shore shelled the Japanese forces on land. The American 
forces were safely within Leyte Gul f , for the big event had 
arrived . l8 
The invasion of Leyte precipitated the Battle of Leyte 
Gulf . The Japanese naval force moved in three columns) 
converging on Leyte Gulf . Three Actions followed. There 
was one in Surigao Strait; one off Cape Engano; and one off 
Samar Island; together they became the greatest naval battle 
of the war . 19 
There was later comment that the golden chance to 
destroy the entire Japanese Navy at one time had been missed. 
However , the victory achieved was enough to convince the 
Japanese that they should never again risk their vessels in 
a fleet action.20 Admiral Halsey stated: 
l7MacArthur, .QE. • ill· , p . 214 . 
18 Cannon , .Ql2. . ill· , p • 59 • 
19J.F.C. Fuller , The Second World War--1939-1945 , 
(London : Eyre and SpottTiWoode , 1948), p:-375 . 
20Frank o. Hough , The Island War, (l?hiladelphia and 
New York: J. B. Lippincott Company, c . 1947) , p . 317 . 
The key point is that we had l"lvO fleets 
in the Ph.ilippine waters under separate 
commands: My Third Fleet was under the 
command of Admiral Nimitz; Tom Kinkaid's 
Seventh Fleet was under the command of 
MacArthur ••• , In my opiniort, it is 
vital for the Navy never to expose itself 
again to the perils of a divided command in 
the same area..21 
MacArthur stated: 
• , •• It was a dramatic situation fraught 
with disaster •••• Should the enemy gain 
entrance to Leyte Gulf, his powerful naval 
guns could pulverize any of the eggshell 
transports pre•ent in the area and destroy 
vitally needed supplies on the beachhead. • 
, , Ashore, all I had been able to do was 
call for carrier air cover over the Leyte 
beaches. Under the divided command setup, 
I had no effectual control over the Third 
Fleet- ••• 22 
The landings on Leyte were easy, compared with most 
amphibious operations in World War II. The weather was 
perfect, there was no surf, no mines or underv1ater 
obstacle$, slight enemy reaction, mostly mortar fire. 
Therefore, "liberation of the Philippinea was off to a 
21w1i11am F. Halsey, ,Adm~r!\ ~~say's ~t;Qri, (New 
York: Whittlesey House, McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 
c. 1947), p. 210. 
22MaeArthur, .2l!• cit., pp, 227 .. 228. 
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good start.u23 
The landing took p1 ce lees t n ix week8 after 
Achnir 1 Halsey had sent h:ts fir t ntea& reporting light 
Japane ere is nee. Tni · w $ th r ault of one of the 
fa t st pice of major ,battle pl ·nning on United State$ 
record. 24 
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Gener 1 MacArthur, :President o ~ na, Getle3l'al R.omulo, 
nd other offic _r waded a hore Oil. the tbi~d a .aault wave . 
To millions of Filipino& MacArthur spoke from the beaohe 
over portable r dio tr nsmitter. The 8 neral said: 
PeQple f the !'hil_iPI!!!!~~-- ... -.~-..;v.! • • • t,__ :ve 
return -d·~ · : ·- .;·---;~liy ·t ;o m • • • • Let 
the :tndomitabl fpirf.t e>f Bataan nd 
Cor1:egidor l.ead on aa the lines of 
batt! roll fo ard to ·bring you within 
the zr,e of operations, tise and strike . 
• . . s \ 
The American people joyfully r eeived the t1ews of the 
auece ·s of the American forees in establi bing the first 
foothold in the Philippine$" Pr lident Rooaevelt congrat .. 
u1ated MacArthur saying that: .. you have the n tion • _ 
"" . 23'samuel Eliot Morison, The n~~ Oce§q W§t:, (Boston: 
Little, Brow, and Company, e . 19 ·3), p. 235 . 
24u &ttle for th , Philippine · , " I?.!t;9ne, 31: 164, 
June, 1945 . 
---------=2'-"-5MaeAr-thut;-,~. , pp. 216·2-:~1-- -------------
gratitude and the nation's prayers for success as you and 
your men fight your way back. , •• u26 
The airfields of Dulag and Taclobaa fell into our 
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hande on October 21, and Army Engineers immediately went to 
work improving them. 27 
There was lighter resistance during the first days of 
battle, and because of the successes, General MacArthur 
thought it would not be necessary to use the 77th Infautry 
Diviaion, now of Guam, on Leyte. On October 29, he tt·ana-
ferred control of tt~ division from General Kreuger to 
Admiral Nimitz. Shortly afterward, the Japanese began their 
reinforcement of Leyte, and a captured .Japaneae field order 
revealed an all-out offensive would be laLu1ched again$t 
American forces in mid-November. This led MacArthur to ask 
Nimitz to direct the 77th Division to tl1e Taclobara area on 
Leyte. Nimitz replied that they were being sent to Manus, 
and when they arrived, operational control would revert to 
MacArthur. The general then ordered this division to Leyte 
on November 15, where they were to be controlled by General 
\ I 
·· 2ocal1non , 9.2. cit • ~ p • 84 • 
27samuel Eliot Morison, .!!:!! Two Ocean !!.!I• (Boston: 
Little, Brown, and Company, c •. 1963},' p~35. ---- ------······-- --
17 
Kreuger. 2B 
On December 7, the 77th Div!eion was landed three 
miles south of Ormoc. This placed tlw Japanese forces in 
this area between two fires. The Ormoc area was taken and 
by the end of December, the whole island waa cleared.29 
The Japane1e had lost more than half their navy. 
Leyte wae to tl~ war in the Pacific wt~t St. Lo was to the 
war in Europe; it was the crushing blow. Documents, 
captured from the Japanese, showed that they were completely 
deceived by MacArthur'• landing on Leyte in 1944, for they 
expected a two prong attack in northern Luzon and Mindanao.30 
there were strong disagreements which developed betweeu 
the War and Interior Departments aa to who should administer 
Civil Affairs in the Islands. The Interior Department wanted 
a civil representative of the High Commiasioner of the 
Philippines to accompany the asaault troop•· MacArthur 
insisted that he should not. The President stepped in and 
resolved the argument in favor of MacArthur, who was to 
28cannon, .2£• cit •• p. 276. 
29Hough, .21!.• cit., p. 3 77. 
30Richard H. iovere and Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., 
Tr..e General and_ t:hr f.r...!tJ~e~~ t_(New Yot:k: :Far~ar, Stra'tl_L__ ····-····-·---····-
--····-··· and Young, c. 19Si), p. 288~ . 
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devise his own policy for civil affairs during the reoccupa-
tion of the Fhilippines.. The general c:reated a civil affairs 
unit in his headquarters and outlined the policies to be 
followed. MacArthur would delegate the administration of 
civil·affa1rs and relief in the liberated areas as soon as 
poaaible to a representative of the Conmronwealth Gove1~nt. 
The only restrictions on Filipinos t-rould be those required 
by military necessity. Tlw Philippine Commonwealth was, by 
arrangement with MacArthur, to determine the guilt or 
innocence of collaborationists, but United States commander• 
were to have authority to deal with suspects if necesaary. 31 
The general also set up financial policies to be 
followed. In liberated areas a new series of Philippine 
Treasury Certificates would be introduced. These would have 
an exchange rate of two per American dollar. Wage rates 
were to be paid to Filipino laborers at an established rate, 
and ceiling prices were set.J2 
Eight Philippine Civil Affairs units were attached to 
the Sixth Army by MacArthur, which were to aid the field 
commanders in the administration of civil affairs and relief. 
3Ieann'oi1'; .22• ill•, p. 199. 
l2Ibid. -
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As soon as conflict ended in an area, a civil affairs unit 
3'=l stepped in t:o restore normal living. ,, 
Orgo.n:f.u~d resistance on Leyt:c hacl uo sooner ceased 
than a nel-1 aea£wlt ·was planned; this 't'WS the reconquest of 
Luzon.34 MacAt·thur stated: 
In ti* campaign for the liberation of the 
Philippiues, I now faced my final and 
decisive objecttve, the recapture of Lu~on. 
It was a difficult and dangerous problem, 
for the J.npaneso ground for:cco gl~Eultly out .. 
n\lmbered my own. I needed one last stepping 
stone before a ma!n attack could be launched. 
The island of Mindoro was selected. It was 
locat:cc just uouth o:J: Luzon in a (;er.t'i7.rtl posi-
tion along the coast. lts poasea•ion would 
cm.able Fl£1 to retlu:n to my stt·ategy of never. 
leaping ahead of my own air cover. Midway 
between T..eyte aud the Lingayeu Gulf area of 
Luzon, an airfield on Mindoro could be used 
to cover a lafl.ding at L1.rJgaye11 » t7hich was to 
be my po:f.nt of assault on Luzon.35 
The general hy•paseed many stt:ongly held islands, 
striking at Mindoro itt the central Philippines • just south 
of Luzon.J6 There camesoveral setbacks, but finally two 
American a:l:rff.elds ~..ve:re aet up on the island by December 23 1 
1944. The battle for Luzon was near, and tho gate to 
33tbfd •• p. 200. 
34Fuller » 2ll• ill· ~ p. 3 77. 
m~SMacArt;:\'t!!:t .$2. .s..i.£. L.'P·-~J7m!~ 
36Hough, .2.2• ill•, P• 317 .. 
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Lingayen was Mindoro; the keys were now held by MacArthur,37 
~1 November 13•14, of 1944, cArthur urgently 
re~u ted that Admiwal lsey continue trike on Luzon . 
The concentration wa tQ be on the Jap ne e reinforcem nts 
which· were b ing m ved 1n .38 
It was ealcul ted that nine divi . ions would be needed . 
The five divi ion in Leyt:e would be t'eady for another 
operation befor the end of 1944, and it w s decided tbat 
these ·would b enough to invad Lu~on , The Joint Chiefs had 
planned the land ·~ngs t Lingayen· Gulf in Luzon for December 
20 . Thi ~as h r d time•table · to follow as re istance on 
Leyte wae prolong d; there had been reviv Jap neae air 
power and Ita ik .ze rAids . The J panese had decided that 
Leyte Wfl;'- ~. _l(t. a and they wer,e c&ncentrating on defending 
Luzon. 39 ---- ..... 
The Lingayen landings in northern Luzon were post-
r' 
pone a cct>Uple of 't«1eel<s nd tool( place on January 9, 1945 . 
The general had utilized the same $pet , Lingayen Gulf ; that 
'37chaJ:l A. W:l.ll.oughby and John Chamberlain, !4{!~~~'h!ar, 
1?~.1"'!195!, (New York: McGre.t~·Hill Book Company •-· Inc ., ·e . 19.54), 
p, 237 . ·I ' 
38 amu 1 Eliot ~rison , 1:!1! lJ! Q.eeEa~ War , (Boston: 
Little? Brown> and C mpany, c •. 1963), P• 472 . 
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the Japanese llaG used three years before. The initial 
resistance was light, for tile main force seemed to have taken 
to the mountains on either side.40 
Generals ~!ac.Ax·thur and Kreuger went ashore, and meet• 
ing with othe1· commanders, stressed t~1e urgency of occupying 
Manila as early as possible in order to f~ee the Allied 
prisoners and inte·.t:neas, who weru slowly starving to death. 
General .1.-ia.cArthur stated that our losses had been small and 
predicted that the Japanese would evacuate Hanila rather than 
defand it. This was the Japa.aese intention, but orders were 
not carried out. 41 
'fhe Japar;.ese evidently did not 'l.vant to risk fighting 
on the broad c:autral plai"i1, and had taken to the mountains, 
leaving the z:·oute open to ?:1anila.. 42 
The move to t.-Ia-nila was slow·, and along the way nativES 
displayed American and Philippine flags welcoming their 
liberators with touching demonstrations. The Japanese had 
ot.·dered Manila evacuated, but 20,000 troops refused to give 
qUHough, ~·£!!a, p. 317. 
4lsamuel Eliot Morison, The Two Ocean War, (Boston: 
Little 1 Brown, and Company, c.-r9'63),' p. 486:--
42Ho1JghL1.2£1 _ill~_ ...... ~~ --······-~·~·-······~~~- ---~--·····-~ --······-
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up and fought on to the bitter end . The fighting turned to 
a hou e to hou , inch by inch fighting as many Japaneae 
def nded Manila . 43 
MacArthur stated i 
I wa fighting on ground tl t had witnessed 
my f t er's mil1t ry tri ph ne rly fifty 
year$ earlier and my own eampaigas at the 
beginning of th war . 1 kne eve»y wr:lnkl 
of th te rain~ every foot of the topography. 
I was ble to avoid m ny a pitfall, to 
circt111lVent ny a en my trap .. To have 
saved l :tvea :l.n thi way i p$rhap my moe t 
gratifying mory of the war. My sta££ did 
not lik my frontline etivity •• •• 
It d taken n rly thr e w k to ke Manil • 
- -
During the mont of battle, the Japanese defense force 
were wiped out almoat to a man. By r eh 4, 1945, __ t city 
of Manila l~d been el ared.~5 
Before the fighting uded; cArt~tr called a 
provision 1 a mbly of Filipino not bl s to Malacanan 
P l ce w re i f t r erv d _ military governor . ln 
r:--
th1 thering he clared the Co the P ilippinea 
premanently reestab1ished . 46 
_ ... , 
. . . 
2i3iior:taon, .22• eit , , p . 488. 
44&oArthur , o • cit . ~ p. 246 t 
45Hough t ~· eit .t pp, 317·318 . , 
46Samuel Eliot Mori . on, lJj! lJii20 Qs§ .~ !1!£ , (Boston: 
Little, Bl:own, ano ompany, ·c . 19 3), P• 288 . 
General MacArthur was not 8at1sfied with the liber-
at :ton o£ Leyte, S mar_ and Luzon . He w nted to chase the 
enemy fom the ene·re area . In February of 1945 , the 
Visayas · nd M!nd nao were to be liberat d by the Seventh 
Fleet and Eighth Al~. Th Joint Chiefs didu t t immediately 
pprov of the e plan , as Gener 1 · sh 11 had tol the 
British at Yalta t · t he had plan for using jor forces 
of the United St · tes to mop up in the Philippines; the 
remaind r would be done by Filipino guerrillas . It looked 
a if the .seventh Fleet and the Eigth Army ,;~ould not be 
needed for Iwo Ji nd Okinawaf o the Joint Chiefs let 
MacArth r o 4 1 chose . 4 7 
The camp ign wa finally elo d . cAr thur · ts.ted: 
On Jul .Jl ,!)_,_ ~ J~·l'l:~~~3~!!1~~ ·. off~e~ 1 end 
Phili~p·_,~- ~-- q,gp, i .- S ·me minor 
isOlate ctfon of a guer:eU.l ture in 
practic ly unin bit d mount in rang · 
was to be e pected, but th gre t 1 d 
m 115,600 _q r - il t ' th its 
populati0n of 17,000,000 wa now fee o 
the nvader .48 , 
Pt-e ident Tr . n d been i.n o ,fic:e only a bo'rt time 
fter the death of Ft;anklin Rooaev lt:-, but h wired the 
--~.,_,Q ..... ,~~b"""!i""t"~s!-•. ,-p. 4 0 •· 
I--------4__:_..8MacAr.thur..~~ .£.U.~-2ft, _________________ _ 
following message: 
My sin.cere congratulations to you and 
your command. You have swept the enemy 
from all the Philippines and redeemed 
the promises of the American people to 
the loyal Filipino people •••• I am 
confident that the potverful base we are 
no,J fashiontng in the :Ph:U~,ppi:nes will 
play its full part i·n the final knocl< .. 
out blou against Japan a:ld :restot·e tll~ 
world to peace, freedom, an~ aon:i.ty.4" 
Strategic mistal<tHl wcr:e made by both MacArthur and 
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the Joint Chiefs durinf) the tin:'J of tho Pj.dlippine mop up. 
~facArthur, .as 1.t l~ter t1.~rned out, co·ul~ have leapfrogged 
the Visayas and lt:inda11ao. The F:Uipiuos in these islands 
were not sufferi·ag gr,;,atly and the Japanese wore cut off 
from reinforcement and ~-1ould have sm:reudereil anyway at the 
end of the war. These forces could have be~n1 used :tn Java 
and Sumatra, where the Dutch colonists ~·ere suffering 
greatly. When !-facArthur did propose l':hr;.~ ··nova, the .Joint 
Chiefs should have fo'ltnd the necessary S~1ippir13, but the 
war waa not expect~d to end so fast. The general proposed 
such a plan in Ff.abruary of 19!}5, to be carried out the next 
June. Higher off:tc:tals held up thf! plan 1.111t:il August when 
it waa too late. By that t:1.me, i"'lncArthur ... w.i: all he could 
*'.. 'trK - I 
- --- --~"~-~Tioh_Con.s..:td.iiJe_ f'mle.ral Dou •;t1 ~'(1 . ···iloro.Arthur- (-Greetl\V~l- --·····-- --······--r-:!'::'-.-~ ~~ ,---- • 
Co11necticut: t~awcett Publications T..nc., c. 1964), .p. 82. 
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handle with the occupation of Japan. SO 
CHAPTER VII 
THE OCCUPATION OF JAPAN 
The Atomic Bomb, which l-7aS dropped Qtl .. . Hir..Qshima and 
Nagasaki in August of 1945, broug~t the Pacific War t a 
rapid conclusion . It was on Augus t 14, that President 
Truman r ece ived the Emperor's acceptance of the surrender 
terms . The President then announced to the world that 
Douglas MacArthur would be Supreme Commander of the Allied 
Powers for the surrender and the occupation of Japan. l 
On August 15, 1945, MacArthur sent the Japanese an 
order by radio for "itn11l.e iate cessation of hostil"tiesu and 
to send "a competent representative" t o Hani la to receive 
instructions for t he formal surrender aud the receptiort of 
occupation forces . The date for the first landings was set 
for August 26, at At sugi Airport. 2 
The basic charter f or surrender and occupation was 
the Potsdam Declaration of July 26 ) 1945. Thi doctnne11t 
ordered the demobilization and occupation of "'the cou11.try 
_ , - !'Kent 'aobe:rt s Greenfield (ed .), 'I'he United St$tes 
Army in World War II , (Washington D.c .:-office of Chief of 
Rrrrtary Risto~ Department of the Army, 1960) , p . 358. 
2tbid., pp . 359 ~360 . -
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eliminated~ Allied Commander 
was to carry out tb.is orcler. 3 
Japa1.1. as 
a military menac~tl; second~ to collect inder.nnities and repar-
ation• demanded by count::r:ies \>Jldch haC! suffered from 
Japartese ag~:n:ass:iotq third, to eat:ablish a "peaceful and 
respous:lhle" govet·l:un.ent, pointed tm.mrd ciem.ocrat:ic principles; 
and fou:r.th, to t:'ec.reat:e an t·H:onom:lc structure which t'/ould 
support th(::~ islands J+ 
ll:tollm Sehald stated: 
. • • th<.~ Occupation generally t-uas 
regarded within Japan as C:"~raeral 
H:acArthur ~ s one ... man shm<T. His per-
$Onality docrdnated cuaat'ly everything 
done by the American authorit1.cs. His 
many statements and press releases set 
the tone of the e·ntire Occupa.t:f.or.i, and 
to most Japactese he waa the fountainhead 
of Allied power. • • • 5 
Sebald ·want on to d:tsclose that th:is idea '\'<TaS pushed by 
~--~~ss~Ii-·Hrines, :t!!<r~~}.t\!r~.~ d..~M-~1, (Philadelphia and 
New Yo:t'l\: J. 13. Lippincott Compar!y, c. 1948), p. 44. 
5William J Q Sehalcl wi-th Russell Brines, With !1§$;AI;thU;&' 
in :!!.P..,ap, f! .2,!rSp,!Ht! .ll!!.\'l~I .2! J:h! Qccua,_t~£>!1, (New Yorkt 
______!.;t_.~\-1. Nouo:~.l---lil.ud-Contpany:,-In~,~lJ}6!"..1)~,-})~-.S4 •.. -~-·· ·······-- ··--~~~~--·-···--
11acA:rthur·' s pol icy of remaining ·'* loof frtlm the Japanese" 
\Vhich gave . him the "appearance of replacing the hithe:t:"to 
it1aco Sible Emperor . n6 · 
88 
One of the small controver !e which ar.o during the 
Occup tion w ~ tl~ conflict '\W·e ·n MacArthur and the Far 
· eern Conmi sion , Even though the general was go ern d 
by ba lie nd detail d directives formulated in t-tashitt ton 
during the clo ins d ys of the waT an tlw beginning of the 
Occupa tion, the policy was evet'ltually set up · y the Far 
E tern Commi sian, composed of el ven Allied powera .which 
sa in W shington . Th Comrnis ion had no d:tl:' ct authority 
over MacArthur, but . ent ·.7hat . a r ferred to a " tar of 
reference . "? 
'£he J oint hief of Staff were the tr n i tting agency 
for p licy deci ion re ched by the ar a ~~r.n Commissi on 
and s eti· a re ar t he e as direat1v to MacArthur. from 
tl 111 ed St t e . ernment 4 This oumb some arrangem0 t 
t t1 e cau ed dis ati faction within tA e omrois ion over 
·: A:t:thu · ' implementatio 1 of it pol:tcy dec~~u·ons . Many 
t th. gene~ l, anticip ting wh t mlgh be coming , 
-----
placed po1icy in effect without waiting for it to ·· be 
autb.orized .a 
William Sebald w .s MacArthur • . deputy on the Far 
Eastern Coromi$Sion~ and of the general' feeling for · th16l 
body he stated: 
MacArthur made no s~cret ef his di$like 
for tbe Allied Council, whieh he regarded 
as an unwanted intru.sian into he eeupa• , 
tion and an unde irable vehicle of Soviet 
propaga.nda .9 
Sebal d tated his own fee ling about the Ce ission as 
follow : 
• • • :r egarded it as a. hig ly important' 
elam nt in the regi and control of 
~ccup:ted Japan and a . useful t6g.anizaticm 
for the United States . • •• 
'ln .Je.pa.n, neral Ma~Arthu was re peated by these 
people f or his ben volence rather than hi powet· . He 
be11e.ved that m:J.lita>:y tlccupa.tiollS could only et Ul' a 
f~ameworJ( fo · ctlemo-er cy . The real job k d to be done by 
the p o le themselves) for dem.ocr cy at "bayonet point" 
would not r~ot.- ,. . It would be overthrown a · oon a . the 
I Pt . 
' 8 ib1-Ji . ; ' p .. 55 .. 
9t~~cl · ) p. 62 .. 
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force was removed . ll 
The general had to begin with pol itical and social 
ref orms for · which thox-e was littl precedent . It wa 
nee a ary to tmow somethina of the J p nese history . . d 
culture , for a · ark d to be :re toed to the beaten 
Jap ne s·e to produce the will and energy o go ahead . 
MacArthur al igned him elf wit:h the ses gains t their 
utocr t , Food wa bro ght in for the p ople who were 
s t arving, and the ener 1' O\m forces t>1ere ordered to eat 
ny of Jap n ' indigenou food products . l2 
The Japanes , of their own free will, wrote into their 
" 
Con . titution a prov:lsion outlawin ,. war. M cArthur explained 
thia act by ta.tin(7 tha Q thes people above all others 
"understand. atomic warfar , ' for t y "counted their dead 
and buri d th m. "13 
Duri g the Occu tion there w 
• 59 . 
c trov rsy over 
\ 
' . ,.... ~ 
13!1i,liJqrx J.S_u tion.!.!! the Far E · ·t, ari11g . b f~re 
Committee on Armed Forces and the committee on Foreign I 
t i on , Unit d s Sen t • 82n · C0ngreae , Fir t 
io , (Wa hington: Government 1nting_Office, 1951), 
P• 233 . 
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problems between MacArthur and the State Department. This 
was largely due to the general 1 s conducting, on his own, 
business which was considered by the State Department as its 
jurisdiction. As time went on, this point was never settled, 
but MacArthur was polite about the situation. 14 
There were many misunderstandings between MacArthur 
and Washington before the outbreak of the Korean War which 
were critical enough for concern. There were times when 
the general pursued his own plans until one of his objectives 
had been completed and then accepted by 'VJashington. If 
there was any complaint from Washington, MacArthur would 
condemn the 11\-Jashington interference, especially by the 
State Department crowd.ulS One issue was over MacArthur 1s 
wanting his own code to transmit messages to Washington. 
Perhaps the most serious single issue between MacArthur and 
State Department officials was over the status of Formosa. 
This centered around a number of arguments outlined by the 
State Department which minimized the importance of Formosa 
in case of attack. This was taken by MacArthur as abandonment 
!4Sebald, ~·£!!.,Po 120. 
15Ibid., p. 119. 
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of Formosa, 16 
Many rumors went around during 1949 about a State 
Department takeover of the Occupation. As this continued, 
the general became more and more irritated and annoyed. 
These rumors seemed to imply that the State Department 
could do the job better than the general.17 
~, one occasion MacArthur charged that a State Depart• 
ment clique was trying to undermine him. This occurred 
.because a British diplomat wauted to see the general and, 
due to the heavy burden of Korea, had not been received. 
The British Embassy in Waahington aeked the State Depart-
ment about it. They, in turn, wrote to Mr. Sebald who 
consulted MacArthur. When Mt. Sebald asked the general if 
it might not be useful for him to occa81onally meet these 
diplomats and brief them on Korea, MacA-rthur stated that 
"this would serve no useful purpoee."lS The general then 
went on in such a way that his egotism began to show: 
••• Why, as a aovereign, should I? 
President Truman doesn't do so, nor 
·- . 15itid:, PP• 120•121. 
17tbid. 1 p. 117. -
--lalbtd.' P• 119. 
does the King of England or any other 
head of st~te •••• 19 
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It seemed as though MacArthur felt that he was per-
forming not a single army assiwunent but an exhalted histor-
ical misaion. He was swept up in the process of reconstruc-
tion with a feeling of spiritual purpose in a moment of 
unsurpassed national disaater.20 
During this time MacArthur wae often in a philosophical 
mood as he contemplated hia handiwork in the Occupation. 
The general ltated in 1948: 
My major advisors now have boiled down 
almost to two men-~George Washington 
and Abraham Lincoln. One founded the 
United States, the other saved it. If 
you go back into their liveaA you can 
find almost all the anewers.~l 
The general eeemed to know that he needed public 
support. but his military background rebelled at tl~ need 
of either defending his actions or explaining them. He 
expected the aame type of absolute authority aa in wartime 
and the same unquestioning eupport. To the general, the 
19Ibid, 
tr" • 
20aichard H. Rovere and Arthur Schleainger Jr. , I!!! 
H.tcstbur Coptrp~J:II.!!.!! Anterf.can Fot,9i.s9 fctlic;x:, (Ne'(v York: 
Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, e. 1951), p. 87. 
94 
critic was t\npatriotic and dangerous.22 
There was another old problem of the general's that 
showed itself during this period of occupation, and th:f.a 
was hie seneitiveneae to preaa critieiam. The press kept a 
close watch on the Occupation and there was plenty of 
criticism. Richard H. Rovere and Arthur Schlesinger Jr., 
in their book The ~~t~~ Con~tgvet•I• state: 
The wonder of the occupation, the mount• 
1ng eenee of historic mission, the pro• 
tect1ve adoration of the ltaff••all theae 
made the Supreme Commander's headqua!!era 
morbidly sensitive to any eriticism. 
A leea aeneitive peraon or a more practiced politician 
would have ignored the attacke, but the general never could. 
Ambaaeador William Sebald ltated: 
' .. 
......... 
The hypersensitive general • • • often 
replied to the attacke on him • • • thua 
furnishing the presa with more copy and 
adding fuel to the contxoveray of the 
moment. Neither MacArthur nor hi.a 
advisor• aeemed to under•tand haw often 
thia tactic helped to enlarge and pro• 
long ieauee that otherwile might have 
died from undernouriShment.24 
22Brinea, l>.E• ill· • p. 68. 
23R.overe. .22• s..u., p. 93. 
2r~Sebald, mm.cm. * cit., J?• 111 .. . . 
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l1acArthur made many ill·advised attempts to di8pute 
publi8bed storiea in the world's newspapers. There were 
times when he launched out at repreaentativea of the State 
Department for reporting what was being printed. Ambassador 
Sebald stated that in 1948 he was ordered by MacArthur "to 
draft a lengthy pretJs release of rebuttal, baaed upon the 
accounts of the preea campaign transmitted to Tokyo in 
routine State Department telegram4. u25 
The quarrels between the general and individual newe 
correspondents became famous while the Occupation was in 
the headlines. Most of the time these skirmilhes were 
magnified. These were battles which the general could not 
win, for the last word wae always had by the preea.26 
Amba11ador Sebald •tated: 
• • • I waa concerned that thete public 
statementa far from convincing the world 
that the United States meant busineal in 
Ae1a, gave aid and comfort to the enemy 
by demonttrat1ng divisions in our leader• 
ship and weakneeae• in our national purpoae.27 
Though MacArthur wal firat of all a militaris=, he 
.... '"'2Sib:td~ -




found h1lll$el£ bogged dotvn with problems of economics and 
human psychology. This was completely a new experience. 
From the outset three goals were to be accomplished. Firat, 
to insure that Japa:rt would not become a major menace to the 
United States or to the peace of the world; second, to bring 
about the eventual setting up of a peaceful and responsible 
government; and third, the clear United States objective of 
keeping Japan out of the Communist camp.28 The first two 
goals were achieved quickly, but the other was a little 
harder to accomplish. 
Ambaasador t\lilliam Sebald stated: 
The achievement of the three major objec· 
tives was in large measure the result of 
the initiative of General MacArthur ••• 
But even MacArthur might have been 
impotent if Washington had failed to 
recognize in time that the pressures of 
evente had out dated many of the carefully 
prepared plans for conducting the 
Occupation •••• 29 
One of the general' a biggest accomplishmeuts il1 Japan 
waa land reform. Land ownership was in the hands of the few 
at the close of t\forld War II. In t-wo years time, about five 
million acres of land changed hands. About two million 
28~.: p. 293. 
29JJ&g., p. 294. 
97 
t enants bee e !andownet· • Thi$ m.ade it pOSJible for Japa111 s 
agll'icult~re to be one of the quickeSt national activitie$ to 
:recover. 30 
General MacArthur has stated that he believed that "the 
t e1i'Jllin tion of tnil1t•ry hoatil:l.tiea Should be a definite 
thing . n He e.l$() stated that the Japanese t:eape.cted and 
a&lired the American way of life . They had been told that 
Am rica wae the mQ$t bt:utal of all nationa ~ but when they 
found that this we. not true, they wanted "to follow us and 
to copy what we did . u31 
• c · "l"Owalt . Sheldc>n, the bno,r abl! ~pnJu~xor.!: The Oe.cw~!t?n 
of Japan, 194!l•19S ~ (New YOt-Ju Tile Maemillan CQlilpany. 1965J. 
pp . 10~,.203. 
t-- -------lo.l.Jear:lng.,O)l •. ~:!£ . , p - 31D~ .-, ~---=.--,--. -----~---------
CHAPTER VIII 
THE WAR IN KOREA 
vmen World War II came to a close Korea wee divided 
at the 38th Parallel, and its internal affairs soo1.1 became 
chaotic. The United States and Russia became involved in 
a dispute over the division of the peninsula. In December 
of 1945, at the Foreign Ministers Conference in MOscow. it 
was decided to establish a joint u.s ... U .. S.S,R. Commission 
over Korea, The United St:a.tee tried to uae this commission 
to set up some type of agreement for nearly two years, but 
no decisions were possible,l 
In 19l}7, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended that 
45,000 troops stationed :ln Korea be evacuated. It wa1 felt 
that thie would uot impair the military poaition of the 
United States iu the Far East,2 
General MacArthur agreed with the Joint Ch.iefe in 
favoring the withdrawal of troops a.t this time. In September 
_.. ·· !wii'i'iantJ. Sebald with Russell Brinee, tvifh .Ha~Ar.th¥}: 
!!! Japan: .A !e~!9ntl .rasto;r;x .2£;· d~e 9fCUJUtt1on1 New Yorio 
W, w. Norton a~d Company, Inc., c. 1965), pp. 177•178. 
_ _ ~~~y S, u'J.'rU!'llan, !!@oi£81 Y~ars of TJzta,l .fll..2 ~· 
--- (New Y.'C41,. Doubleday and---eompauy,-1.-nc. , 1956 , p-;----3-25. 
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of 1947, the general said that "there was nothing peculiarly 
threatening at that time in Korea. 113 He also went on to 
state that there had been considerable pressure from South 
Korea for the removal of these troops. President Truman 
stated that our commander in Korea, Lieutenant General John 
R. Hodge, reported that the Koreans felt that under the dual 
occupation no real freedom or independence could be accom-
plished, and that "they wanted their independence and were 
beginning to think that the Allied powers were not sincere 
in their promise." Hodge also added that "it was growing 
daily more apparent that their capacity for self-government 
would not greatly improve as long as the dual occupation 
eontinued."4 
When the North Koreans plunged across the 38th 
Parallel in 1950. the American government received its first 
report from the United Press News Service instead of from 
the military personnel in Korea. General MacArthur was 
3Militarx Situatign !n the Far !!!£, Hearings before 
the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign 
Relations, United States Senate, 82nd Congress, Firat 
Session, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1951), 
pp. 242- 243 • 
4Truman, .!m. .ill• , p. 318. 
5 ,'1Sked for a report.· 
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area. l~hen i.t ~·TMJ completf!d, he said that the South Koreans 
~'7ere in sood defens5.v.e posi tlons anil shotud be able to hang 
on. ThE~ eencral indicated that upon h.is retu:rn to Tokyo he 
"t.;rou.ld :request comm:l tmet"1t of Uni tecl States troops. 6 
The Pres:lden~:: of t:!1e Hni ted States and his advisor a 
unanimously agret~d tl'•a.t the North. Korean invasion must: be 
repulsed. As Trum.an stated, thera was nan almost unspol\en 
acceptance on the part of: everyone that v1hat ever had to be 
dona to m.ect thie aggrension had to he done. n7 
The Un:i.ted States official policy \vas that it ~7a8 
reeponding to the aggression :ln Korea as part of a concerted 
United Nations actlon, just as were other members of that 
body. It was understood that tt·~e United States would be 
the major contributor because of its interest in the Jlacific. 
The United Nations Security Council, on July 7, 1950, set 
.. - · Siotin -w."·spardel:, !!:!! !£UtqfLJl•·l:f!cArJ:.h.Ht Con trgy.!!'f.~l! 
n.nd the Kore:J:n Vat :~ (New Yorl<: W. W. Norton and .Company, 
"in'C.:C.T9-6S), p. 21. ' 
6Hal ter Kar1.g ~ Malec 1m lJ. Coyle, and Frank A •. Hanson, 
!P.~~~ +\eEOI!=.: ~ tvSI .!!1 Korea~ (New York: Rinehart and 
Company, Inc., 1952), p. 55. . 
7Truman, .22• ill•, p. 334. 
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up the only wot·kabl~ arrange~uent by n:comrnending that a 
unified command be established in Korea, and that tne United 
States name the commander.8 
President Truman :immediately ordered MacArtnur to use 
American air and naval power to St:tpport. th.f1 Sout.h Korean 
Army. The American fot·ces we:t'e, however, to limit the:tr 
operations to the area bt~low tl.J.e 3l3t.h parallel. \<lhen 
MacArthur let 'l'nnmm ~-·now ho~;r desperate the situation \vas, 
and asked for .a. c.ounter-offensive, the President authorized 
him to use ground units. All three branches of the A'llerican 
armed services were comm:itted.9 
There was sorne concern about MacArthur's appoint1nent 
to this new a.ssigumeut. James Reston, in b:ls column 1.n the 
New York Times, stated: 
..,._..,.,...__........, -·· ... 
. • .. HscAl:·ti~ur is a sovereign pot,Jer in 
~tis Dl\"l:l r:1.gtit, wi tn s tubbot'n coufl.deuce 
:i:n his own judgment. Diplomacy and vast 
eo11corn for the opinions ar1d seasitiveness 
of others are the political qualities 
essenti.al to this new assignmeut, and 
these are precisely tile qualities General 
I1acArthur h.as been accused of lacking in 
B}i;,~·~YJ. 'Middleton, .!.ill! ,C_q~y_Eact J!.iJ!,!;;!?r.:t £! ~ ~9.1:e~·9 
!'li!r, (New York: Hawth.orn Books Inc.~ 1965), p. 53. 
9Truman, .2!!.• ill· , pp. 337-338. 
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the past.10 
This statE-~ment began to show itself to be true; MacArthur 
still seemed to lacl< these qualities. 
\~hen it looked like the ground situation in Korea was 
desperate, the Joint Chiefs of Staff sent a directive which 
not only gave MacArthur control of the Seventh Fleet, but 
also gave him permission to attack military targets north 
of the 38th Paralle1. 11 
General MacArthur, during the Senate investigations 
following his dismissal, stated of his early defensive 
tactics in Korea: 
••. I felt that it was entirely proble-
matical whether we could save any remnants 
of the South Korean Army or establish any 
position in Korea. My directives were to 
establish a beachhead in the neighborhood 
of Pusan and take such steps as I felt I 
could within the means I possessed to 
support the Korean government and help 
maintain the South Koreans.12 
The general's immediate problem was to halt the 
advance of the enemy ground and flank units, The force that. 
MacArthur had to work with was worn out from World War II, 
16column in the ~ .!2.£.! Times, July 9, 1950. 
llKarig, £2• £!!., p. 44. 




and had old equipment frorn this period lso . He had requested 
mor e troops, but had been turned down by Washington . One 
-~ ,,, --·· -- ~~-----.- ............ ---- ,. 
reason for t his wa the fa~t that in the first d rk 6 ys of 
the w r, Washington w s haping for speedy contai~nt . 
This was because it was felt ·that Korea might be a move to 
divet·t attention from an amphibious move elsewhere . 13 
One of the big problems that arose duri.ng the Korean 
War was .the question over the u~e of Fortno an troops, In 
the early days of the war HacArthw; had adv sed .against t he 
use of Form.o n troops i.n ~orea beeau e he felt t hat t his 
'\<iould not only we ken t a t country •· · defense, but that t hey 
would need so much lo istical training th<at t hey "would be 
an 4lbatross round Gur neck f 0r mot"lths . nl4 L$ter the 
general wanted to use these troops gainst t he a~inistration •s 
~he , 15 
Pres ident Trum n s nt veri 1 Harriman on a m~s&ion 
to speak with MacArth r a d clear up the que tion of Formosan 
troops~. When the meeting d taken place, t he Pres.ident 
hoped t t t hi s would ele r up the situation, but t hese hopes 
........_____ __ ---I3""'M""!'i~d"!""'!"'!l~· e-ton, .2!. .ill• , p • 43 9 
ll~Ibid . , .p . 98 . 
15 lbid . , p . 99 . -
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we~ce soon shattered. A :f:ew weelcs later the general sent a 
message to the V1aterans of Foreign Ha.rs criticizing American• 
For.~losnn policy .15 
One of the outstanding events of ti1.e Korean \1!ar ~~:~as 
tbe Inc~20n Invasion. Tl.1e original idea for an a.mp~y.f.b:lous .. 
land:f.ng at Inc bon -v:ras General ~lacArthur 's and his n1one. 
Tli.e idea. was conceived in. early .July aud the general had 
ar;:_;ued for :tt ~v-ttl:1 every senior military cmmnander :J.n the 
Far Eastern Ttl!f,atc:;r. l'nis was to 'be the tnost brilliant 
military success :in a cat:eer o£ many successes, but also 
the start of a chain of events tJhich was to lead to his 
reruova1. 17 
The day after Seoul fell, HacArthur stood on the banks 
of the Han River planning his next move. He dec:l.ded on the 
amphibious invasion of the Port of Inchon on the west coast 
of Korea. Th:i.s port was about 25 miles from Seoul. This 
seeraed to be the natural operation for £'1acArthnr to think 
of, for. it \.rae this type of maneuver ·\.;rhich had brought him 
his successes of Horld \-Jar Ir.l8 
1 -, 
~~!'.axi.g, .Q.E.• cit., p. 159. 
18r1iddleton, 9.2• ill•, p. 102. 
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The obstacles to the Inchon invasion wer e great , but 
so lfere the opportunities . General Edward A. Al mond , 
MacArthur ' s Chief of Staff , sta ted that this wa the "wor t 
possibl e place for an amphibious a s ult, but it was also 
the only place where our assault would c rry out its 
purpose . .. 19 This purpo e was to cut off and destroy the 
enemy . A ucces ful landing would force the North Koreans 
to retre t in two pl ce t once and would ta e the pre sure 
off the Pusan beachhead . This would pl ce the United Nations 
forces next to he princ pal supply routes that ran north 
nd south of Seoul . cArthu _ stated that "the history of · 
war pr ove that nine out of ten t imes an army has been 
destroyed becau e its upply lines have een cut of£ . '120 
The pl an ad many critic , nd the general stood 
against them all . He insist d tl t only th capture of 
Inchon and Seoul would accompli h what he w nted••"to cut 
the enemy ' supply line and e 1 off t he entire outhern 
peninsula . n He had a talent for a forceful presentation, 
but often left many logical question unanswered . The 
orities were more concerne4 with t he problems Inchon 
20Ibid . ' ' -
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created. 21 
MacArthur admitted that Inchon's problems were import-
ant, but were not impossible. He added that "Inchon will 
not fail; Inchon will succeed, and it will save 100,000 
lives." The general admitted that he realized "that Inchon 
is a 5000 to one gamble, but I'll accept it.n22 
In replies to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, MacArthur 
insisted on Inchon as the place of invasion. He stated 
that the "very arguments you have made as to the imprac• 
ticabilities involved will tend to ensure for me the element 
of surprf.se. For the enemy commander will reason that no 
one would be so brash as to make such an attempt."23 
There were also charges that the Inchon plan was no 
secret. On September 16, 1950, the!!! York Tribune stated 
that Inchon was one of the worst kept secreta. It was 
known all over Korea and Japan. The article also stated 
that if the North Koreans did not know it, they were the only 
ones who did not. Even army field commanders were using this 
news to bolster troop.'.·morale along the front. The local 
21Middleton, ~· £!!., P• 105. 
22Ibid• 
--------------------~------------------------------------------------------------
23spanier, ~· cit., p. 79. 
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population must have known, for th.e build up of men a11d 
equipment was being done in their full view; it would h.ave 
been impossible to hide it.24 
Many times in his career the general had displayed 
over-confidence; now he displayed this again. He Bade such 
stateoents as: ilt,Je shall laurl at Inc"':.ton and T sb.all crush 
them!"25 The use of the first person seemed to betray a 
'10: 
givi.ngs about tht-::1 ehoice of Inc~1on were erased. 11 "'0 Tht: 
Tides 1 ihl:t ted :it to four dated .. -
September fifteenth) October eevenb.1, tlove,Tther Sl~'-!Oi.ld ?.nd 
third. The sencral chose the first ctatA, for it would ~ot 
only l.'el Jeve the strain. on the tb:-erl tro<.lp.S A.t eusan, but it 
would le. t l;he people ¥1\10 -.·~m1ld be l tberated in th:ln area 
z~ .)Kari v ··1n ···1· -~ p lr-,9 ~, .~· -~;_·, ·• v. 
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factor was the opposition to the plan; this made the general 
believe that the enemy would not think he would risk it.27 
The Inchon landing turned out as MacArthur had pre ... 
dieted; his brilliantly conceived ar.d sldllfnll't ~xecuted 
operation caught the eaemy completely i'Y surpr:i.s::, VvYry 
history of warfare. The general iutd ga.r11bled ~d t:h dis as t:er 
,, :P 
anrl it had beeu successful!-.; 
The Hri tis~~ ni~toriau. David R.e(;S C!escribes Inchon as 
bt1.t HacArtltu:c,': n:r.t cvme £rom Ids ov,;:r·po\--leril"Ag personality 
and hi9 self·· conJ::hltntcc. n29 
it~ ·,_..i.tim.al.:e results it seamB amhi;:uoqs. Its vet::y success 
meaut that the Cni ted Nations war aims ~Jere r·aisecl b.:om the 
t 
3t1th :t·ara.llcl to t~1t: Ya.lu ldve:t·. JO 
ryn 
.... 0 Ibl~ r '{1 • '-~•, lJe C. • -
2J1Javitl h.ees, !s!EJ;..q: 'Hi.~ Lf,,dtcd ~::.!X.) (Loudo.u: 
Macl"iillan .c:n1d Compa.r:~y~ Ltd.7!964);·~~p: 9G. 
30 q,J.· .-l ,..., ...... 
~-
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The controversies that surrounded MacArthur•s plan 
for Inchon did not disappear with the victory, but were 
hidden in an avalar1cl'1e of praise which flooded him. The 
question of whether the invasion waa ~,;orth t:.1o :rlst{ or not 
still stood out. For many, this qucstio·~1 has .';wd no .a.nswer. 
Even though ti.1e general professed to see tne:r: it ii.l. tne 
objections of h:ts critics, he seemed to more strongly 
indicate that he was actually resentful and contemptuous of 
them. He discarded their obJections as "timid:tty and 
defeatism.n 3l 
The very success at lnc::ton l·Ton,s>lt up a:nother point. 
It left little doubt that if a difi.:tcult slt·~ta.tion 't.;rould 
come up again, MacArthur would prefer again to use L1is m-m 
judgment rather than need th.a advice of t>K~ Joint Chiefs of 
'}/b 
Staff.'"""' 
By the ena of 
(was it1 Allied hand• 
September virtually all of South Korea 
and the liorth Korean force l-iaS shattered. 
\ 
l:·'lacArthur callt.HJ t:Lt Ute t:mehlY to, SLtrrcndcr. on October 1, but 
There was now a great deal of eolid 
military reason fol~ carrying tht:~ v~a.:r into the north. There 
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was much debate on the issue, but finally, through the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, President Truman authorized MacArthur, in 
a series of messages in late September, to go beyond the 38th 
Parallet.33 
The general had asked for more men, and here again one 
of the same suspicions that he had had in early World War II 
crept up. The general felt that the reason for the lack of 
reinforcements was that Asia was being placed near the bottom 
of the list of American il1terests. He once again had the 
idea that Asia was being sacrificed to Europe. 34 
All of the general's instructions regarding his planned 
operations in North Korea stipulated that his authority to 
operate was valid only if there were no signs of Chinese 
intervention. 35 On October 9, MacArthur received directions 
which changed these instructions slightly. He was now 
permitted to pursue the war in the north, even if Chinese 
involvement was encountered. The general was told that he 
could move north as long as he thought that the forces 
' llMiddleton, ~. £!£., p. 119. 
34spanier. ~· ill·, p. 82. 
35Middleton, ~· £!!., p. 130. 
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now under his control had any reasonable chance of success. 
The instructions also stated: "In any case you will obtain 
authorization from \oJashington prior to taking any military 
action against objectives in Chinese territory.n36 The 
Joint Chiefs of Staff directed the general that as a 11matter 
of policy" only South Korean troops should be advanced into 
the northeastern provinces bordering the Soviet Union and 
along the Manchurian border. 37 Secretary of Defense Marshall 
wired MacArthur: "We want you to feel unhampered tactically 
-... 
and strategically to proceed north of the 38th Parallel."38~-~ 
On October 15, P1:esident Truman summoned ~lacArthur to 
a meeting at Wake Island to discuss the last phase of the 
United Nations involvement in Korea. The President asked , __ 
the general what the chances of Chinese intervention would 
be and ~facArthur gave a very optimistic answer. He 
estimated that the Chinese had 300 .ooo troops in Ma.rtchuria, 
and that only 58,000 to 60,000 of these could be moved 
across the Yalu River. These the general felt could be 
destroyed by his air force. Even as MacArthur was giving 
his optimistic reply four Chinese armies 120,000 strong 
~6Truman, .2.2• ill•, p. 362. 
37Hearings, ~· ~., pp. 1216, 1217. 
38tbid., P• 132. -
112 
were moving into positions opposite the United Nations 
forces. These were soon joined by lBOtOOO Red Chinese 
troops which moved to the northern border of the Yalu River •39 
The real tragedy of the conference 'f\las the fact that 
there had been no realistic attempt to come to gTips with 
the great issues that stood between these two men. 40 
Ambassador William Sebald stated: 
MacArthur compared his forthcoming meet ... 
ing with President Truman to his World 
War II journey to Pearl Harbor for a major 
conference with President Roosevelt.41 
At Pearl f~rbor MacArthur had convinced President Roosevelt 
to authorize a return to the Philippines which the Navy 
had proposed to by-pass. Now the general had prepared for 
another such conference.42 
President Truman had called this Wake Island Confer• 
ence mai·nly because there seemed to be a fundamental 
difference between the MacArthur and l!Jashington vieto;rpoint 
r.t T1..1e ...... in disaareement was over the on the Korean war. 1 a<Q o 
••• '11 
39Middle'ton, SW.• £.!:!• , p. 127 • 
40Ibid., p. 132. -
41sebald, ~·cit., p. 217. 
113 
relative ilnportance of Europe and Asia in global strategy. 
This was an old disagreement; it was a hold-over from 'Vjorld 
Ha.r II. HacArthur believed that the Communists would conquer 
Europe through Asia if not stopped, but the administration 
kept on building up forces in Europe.43 
General H.acArthur launched his "Home for Christmas" 
or November Offensive knowing that there were at least 
100,000 men facing him and 40,000 guerrillas behind him. 
He also knew that the size of his assa.ul ting force was 
inadequate for a frontal attack. The general split his army 
in two, taking a tremendous gamble, creating an attractive 
and fatal vacuum. Being confident of success, he made his 
military dispositi.ons not on the assumption of massive 
Chinese Communist intervention, but on the enemy that 
existed. MacArthur stated that he was limited by the size 
of his force and the mission given him. This mj.ssion was 
to clear out all North Korea and to unify it. 44 
The appearance of Red Chinese forces in the war caused 
concern in Korea that was not shared in Japan. ~~hen 
Washington, worried ab-:-ut re!:,orts of this, asked MacArthur 
44Spanier, ~· £!!., p. 122. 
114 
£or an evaluation, be warned against 'thasty conclusions. n45 
Two days later the general be1an to sound the al rm order• 
ing his air force to bomb six major bridges aeross the Yalu 
River. The Joint Chief of Staff immediately countermanded 
the order and rem1t'ided ~fac.At-thu of restriction not 
allowing A111 d pl. n to strike ~1th1n five miles of this 
river. The gener 1 ;:i.ent back a trong protest which 
urprised the Jo.int Chief because it was so different from 
the previous mess ge$" The Joint Chi fa then authorized 
--- -· _. .••• - - --~· - -· ··-· -- _ .,... ____ ........ + • 
MacArthur to bomb the Yalu br:ldg s ~ .but only .front the Korean ..... -.. ' ..... ~ ·:- . 
side . 46 ' ' \. n i;l. '.(...k. ·, , '--t' CA."d' 0 ' ~ \t . ) 
\~)\ ,v~( ·~e 
Gener 1 MaeArthur stated t t the reason$ for his 
November defe ts were the restriction& "without precedent 
in h.:t tory," wh:toh d prevented hf.tn from bombing supply 
base in Manchuria, or even the Manchurian side of the Ya.lu 
bridge · , and followin enemy planes over the Manchurian 
bor.de~.47 In time he would even 4ee treason in these 
Later the general stated that his November Offenaive 
w a of a ·r.econnai sanee n ture . To thie General Mara hall 
_lflli._, .. ,., 
46lbig. , P• 138 , 
47~bl9 · , p. 157. 
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pointed out that no general launches a reconnaissance with 
his whole army. He holds his main force to the rear a a 
precaution, particularly when the enemy might possibly 
drive a wedge between t:wo wings of his army thereby roll• 
1ng up the flank and ~ear of either or both. 48 
General Collins stated: 
I don't believe that in the initial phase 
it was considered aa reconnaissance in 
force at all, because General MacArthur 
wae ben.t upon destruction of the North 
Korean forces.49 
In his memoirs, President Truman stated: 
Non· no one is blaming General MacArthur, 
and eerte.inly 1 never did for the failure 
of the November Offensive • • • But I do 
blame General MacArthur for the manner in 
which he tried to excuse his failure •• 
50 . 
• • 
The President has stated tM.t MacArth\.•r misinformed him, 
and he has strongly implied that he '\\Tould not have ordered 
the north,it"lU:'d advance if his field commander had correctly 
estimated Pet,ing 'a inteuti.ous. 51 In order to eval ua:i:e thia 
~8'Span1er, .22• .ill•, p. 127. 
49Hear1ngs • .21!• cit., p. 1369. 
50Truman, !m· .ill•, p. 381. 
·····--- -- 51-tbid•-,~3%3-.-- ---- --······-----
wos past even for Soviet 
-- ( ).J.\J 
of Ght:n.ese ground forces supported by Russian Air Force.)2 
Possibly tho gonc:ral t'>TRB not so concerned because he b . .s.d been 
allot-ved perm1.ss1.on to bomb fmd blockade ll.orth Koree a.ft;er :i. i; 
atte.cked; therofore, he m:i.eht he.ve e.:;:pected 1;o recet vc 
perra:tssion to bornb ~:md blockade Communist; Ch.inc 1;oo if sb.o 
MacArthur later stated that "the 
disposition of those troops ••• could not have been improved 
upon, hs.d I known the Chinese were going to attack."54 
The general charged espionage for the failure of his 
l1ake Island prediction. This seems to point our that 
Jv1acArthur must always be 110 per eent rlgbt. It could not 
be that he had made a :mistake; it had to be that he was 
$2Ibld., PP• 383-384. -
53Spenier, 2£• £!!., P• 92. 
54-Hearings, .2£• ill•, P• I • 
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destroyed by enemies at home. This betrays a curious atate 
of mind, for it seems as though he feared that his great 
record would be wiped out by a mistake. The general himself 
had often made the statement: "I have always been able to 
take care of the enemy in front, but have never been able 
to protect my8elf from the enemy in the rear."55 
The general was the figure of a sad and lonely 
commander, with great victories to his credit, fighting to 
avoid any defeat which might mar hil last command. He 
believed that the change of policy in Korea was, rather 
than a military matter. a political one. He never changed 
from this idea.S6 
General MacArthur 1 a concept of the Korean War came 
out in an interview Ambassador William Sebald held with the 
general on November 14. 1950. MacArthur said that the 
immediate objective was to destroy the bridges acroas the 
Yalu River and thus isolate the area between the United 
Nations forces and the North KoJ:ean border. He went on to 
say that if this failed. he saw no altemative to bombing 
S5span1er, .sm.. .£!.S. , p. 94. 
56Middleton, R2• £!£., p. 155. 
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key points in Manchuria.57 
By late 1950, it was clear that there were two 1rrecon-
cilable viewpoints to the war. Washington was looking for an 
l10norable end to the conflict, while MacArthur thought we 
should have vietory.58 
On November 28, 19 50, MacArthur aunounced that 1'heavy 
Chinese reinforcementsu were in the nprivileged sanct:uaryll 
of Manchuria and that now "we face an entirely new war.o59 
In December, t1acArthur submitted a plan to the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff for bringing the war to an end. This plan 
encompassed four ideas any of which Washington felt could 
enlarge the tvar. 60 ri'he first called for the intensifica-
tion of our economic blockade against China; the second was 
tt~ imposition of a 11aval blockade against the China coast; 
the third called for the removal of restrictions on a.ir 
reconnaissance of China's coastal areas and of Manchuria; 
and fourth, the removal of restrictions on the forces of 
- .. "5'1 . ' Sebald,~·£!!., p. 203. 
58tbid., p. 220, 
59~., p. 204. 
60Middleton, .22• cit., p. 159, 
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Nationalist China on Formosa. 61 Tt~ general later testified: 
• • • In my own professional opinion, 
Comraun1s t China, its pcn.,-,et· to t1age 
modern war has been tremendously 
exaggerated; and I believe when \ole 
place pressure, the blockade pressure, 
and the disruptive pre•aure of the air, 
on it• distribution systems, that sb.e 
would be forced to yield w~Fhin a 
reasonable period of time. ,J2 
The Joint Chiefs of Staff set.lt r1acArthut· orders to 
hold in Korea if he could with tt1e tt·oops he 11a~:..; had and 
under the reatrictions now in effect. The general felt that 
this would subject his command to severe losses and that 
nthe issue really boils down to the question of whether or 
not the United States intends to evacuate Korea.n63 He 
l.;tter stated that, in his opinion, he could hold on in Korea 
for any length of time up to the complete destruction of his 
own forces, if such a course was dictated by political con-
siderati~ns or factors.64 
."--
Pre1ident Truraan issued a statement announcing that :tf 
62Hear1.nes, 9.£.. £ll. , p. 58. 
63 Middleton, 9..11• ill•, P• 1.60. 
64 Hearings, .QR.• ~.!!·, p. ,488. 
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continued resistance should not prove possible with the 
force a under MacA.'t'thur 's command, and "~i thdra,qal from Korea 
became necessary; that the United States "shall not accept 
the result politically or militarily until the aggression 
hat been rectified. n 65 This was t:al\cn by Ma.c.Arthur as an 
indication that .America had decided not to 1vin in Korea. 
The general sent a message to tl::.e Co1mnanoer in Chief 
of the Veterans of Foreigll Wars arguing that -w·hat t-vas needed 
was "aggressive, resolute, and dyaarnic lei!adership • a and 
that "nothing could be more fallacious than the thre.adbare 
argument by those who advocate appeasement a11d defeatisrn' 1 
that we would alienate Asia if '''e defendE.1d Formosa. 66 
f'resident Truman ~.ras irritated by this letter p-ublishing 
the idea that the government in "t,Jashinr;to1'l v:ras :::·esponaible 
for MacArthur's troubles for limiting the fighting to Korea. 
The thillg that galled the President most \'Tas the general' a 
giving public voice. to his resentruents. !)7 
On March 20, MacArthur wrote a letter to a member of 
the House of Representatives • Joseph H. Martin, in answer 
65Midd.leton, ..9..2· .£ll., pp. 151·1&2. 
66ft:g,_!.q., p. 354. 
67~1iddletoa, 9£• £..:ti•, p. 157. 
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to n address Martin had made •ugges.tlns the use of Nationalist 
Chinese troop . in Korea. Th1 letter wa a challenge to 
e iit1ng national policy of· the Unit d St tea . The las t 
paragraph reached a elimax with the t tement$ '·'There is no 
&ubatitut for v:tctory.,n68 
-· ,.. . ., 
President Truman felt that thi letter hawed that the 
general was not only in dieagreeme t with the policy of the 
government, but waG challenging th s policy in open insubordi~ 
nation to his Commander- in- Chief. 69 The President st ted 
that .,there $ a ri l t kind and wrong kind of victory, jttst 
as there are a.r ol: the right· thin and wars that are ' 
wrong fr every standpoint . u70 
Presid nt ru . be an to d:r ft ting that 
he w willing to negot ate with the Commuuiats . At the 
time, to dr4ft h. own m 
concluded with the · ropos 1: 
• • • 1 t nd ra dy t any ti e to confer 
in t 1e field with the Commander ·n Chief· 
o the e y otc in tho t effott 
to ftnd y ilitary mean whereby realiza• 
tion of the political ~b etf.vee of th 
• 58T~urttan: o • e it., i> . 446 . 
69tb d. 
United Nations ill Korea • • • might be 
accomplished without further bloodahed.71 
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Though t'1acArthur called this a. Hroutinen message, it brought 
out many problems. President Truman sa:f.d that it was 11croas• 
purposett to the orse that he was preparing t and added: ult 
would have confused the world if my carefully prepared 
$tatement had been made."72 
In t<Jashington tbis \\'as talH.2n a.s open defiance. The 
President thought that the and had been reached as he 
stated: 
• • • 1 could no longer tolerate his 
insubord:I.naticm. t-iacArthur h.acl actually 
threatened the enemy with an ult1.matum 
intimating that the full preponderance 
of Allied power might he brought to bear 
against Red China •••• 73 
Th:la announceme(tt \laS re.nd by Pres:T.r1ent Truman on 
April 11, 1950: 
••• \vith deep regret I have concluded 
that Geaeral of the Army Douglas MacArthur 
is unable to give his t;holchearted support 
to the policies of the t~1ited States 
Goven1E~ent a:nd of th.e United Nations in 
matters pertaining to ~:lis off:lcial dutieS 
72 . . 4 Truman, .92• ill··, p. 40. 
••• I have, therefore, relieved General 
MacArthur of co!l'li:!U\nds • • • (',eneral 
t1acArthur 1 s place in history as one of 
our greatest commanders ie full.y esta .. 
blished •••• 74 
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This announcement stunned the Ame.r.ican people. Many 
He 
returned furme to a turault.:uous welcrJm~ '•zrh:f.ch :rr.1aci.led its 
clil.1u:u~ with his speech ·before a jo:int snssion oJ: Co-ngress 
and the Senate Hearings wh1ch follmJecl. 75 
General tlacArt:hur answered the el1arge of insuborclina• 
t:ion as follo-v;s: 
Senator I have been a soldier fot· 52 years, 
I tl.,"~T~'"' .~ln ·-·;., ... .;- ~-imc 1··o +-1··., hnr:>t- "'0.(! ..,.,v .... t, C't ..... ,, "' t .... · . .;::'. ... . ... ·--~ "' ' ·-· ~.~ ---~,... · .. t;...~ ..:._,) ,_,_.. J.. i ~ "J 
ability, carried out ~very order that was 
t'?.Ver r;ivon. rne. No more $uhordinate soldier 
1:188 ever 'ti1orn the Atoor-.ica.n uniform. I 
~·.if"l' l r1 1'(YI'>': •il-1 q '~"'""' q·•1\' ... , "'n~--c·r t· {·!·:a- ~~ I ·v·o1' ld"' t '"" 1- ~' "~•~< u ,. .. ,., .. i.. :.,.j.,.. ·'"'"-~ ......,.t); 1,:,.._1, ., o\ ... l./ ..... ~- ·.-..:·~ ..... lp< •• ·~ • ",>) ~ ~t l ... 
carry out any order that ,~,.as given me. If 
yo1J j'f\ean to so.y that tho or.dc:rs I have 
carried out I l-las in agreement tdth, that is 
a different matter.76 
Ou the qtlestJ.o.'J of Hhy tho ~tm.e:rn.l ·was reli.eved, 
(~nLJ.ra1 n.,,.,.. ~~..,...,dl-"''~>" ~··r.gt .. T {!-7cc ·1·.:!.>1t ;:.;,: .Jt.Z.dn .. 't. n,,..c.·r·~"" t1.,..,t ~""' "'-' - VL .• ~.,_ , 1Jc -,, .•• '<·.; '•'-' .., •.• $. ,u,. ,.. • ,_ . ·~ tl '"CJ ... c ..,.. 
C.eneral 1-ls.cArthur was relieved because he disagreed on 
--------------~~~tl~e~a~r~i=n~L~S~,~.9~=)~.~£L~t''!~-.-,~p~.--Z7._o __________________________________________ __ 
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policy,n but because ube carried it to the people and not 
through the channels to the Commander-in•Chie£. 11 77 
To the question that the general t11as right in what he 
planned to do, General Bradley h.aa stated tnat ' 1to have 
extended the fighting to the mainland of Asia would have 
been the wrong war, at the wrong time and in the \~ong 
plaee.n78 
In hitJ teatimouy, General Mal.·& hall remblded the 
committee of the fact that the policies of the United States 
weren • t tho only ones involved. 'there were also the poli· 
eiea of the United Natioue and General MacArthur waa the 
United Nations con1lilalldar. 79 On. the question of General 
M.a,eArth.ur • & c.ar:t·y;I:n}~ out of ordlilr& i'tarsha.ll answered: 
Uc did not violate the policy by military 
action, but he took iS&tte with the policy 
be fore th~ ~mrld • • • Aud created a 
situation t-Jh.ere apparently l7e had two 
vie-ws speaking for th:l.a cotmtry because 
he was the Supreme Commander o£ those 
troops o:~ those nations :1nvolved.80 
The se.~-lei'itl hacl actually bee11 dismissed for three 
78Truman, o,;a. £!!•• p. 446. 
__ ·19H~ar:lngs, .2.2· ill•, p·. 414. 
···-~--~ -----················----~---·~~-
tlOtbid., p. t1l6. -
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reasons. F~rs~, was the fact that he had fai led to get 
clearance for his statements as he had been direc ted to do 
by the President; S.econd , fbecause he challenged the place of 
the -President as the na~ion 's. spokesman on foreign policy ; 
and third, that he did not agree "t>Tith the national policy 
of trying to l imit the conflict to Korea . 81 
Ambassador tHlliam Sebal d , w·ho knew MacArthur quite 
well, summed up the Korean situation as follows: 
MacArthur handl ed his various cmmnand 
responsibilities and the innumerable 
challenges of t he situation in a 
characteristic way long familiar to 
Washington . Wi th his sense of history, 
experience, seniority, reputation, and 
tempereJnent $ he did not easily compro-
mise when his judgment or his decisions 
were questioned. Although he knew when 
to conform to specific superior 
authority, he did not hesitate to 
advance his views vigorously . He was 
never reluctant to interpret his 
authority, broadly or to make decisions 
and act quickly--argui ng the matter 
later. Many in Washington remembered 
these s e qual:tties from World War II 
and resented them even more in the semi-
peace of the pos twar era. 82 
Sl!bid o . -
CHAPTER IX 
;iUH\IlAHY AND CONCLUSION 
General MacArthur's campaigns il.ave brought him much 
praise. Thomas R. :l?u:i.ll:fps has state(\ tt,st tbe ;1campaign in 
the Pacj.f:J.c from Australia through tu.e Pitilipp:i.nes to .Japan 
was a marvel of ingenuity."! Gener s.l Bernard Nom~ i' o~nery 
'-' 
stated that his campa:l gn proved NacArtbur to be ntt1e best 
soldier the United States produced during tJorld \.var 11, 11 and 
added that "iH~ :.C:nugnt a. llO':oderful t'!ampa.lgn in the Pacific. <~2 
Desp:i.te ~'1eoe a.nd many other congratulatory statements, 
the general alhays .seemed to he s•.n:rounded wi tb. controversy 
and friction. Tlu·~re seen1s to be several reasons for this 
and they all, in ~wn1e :.va.y, poi'nt to certain aspects of the 
general's personal qualities. 
One point is touched •.tpon by Franl< Kelley and Cornelius 
Lef~ (nture b:l.ographers of. i<iacArtaur note 
-----,_1'0E7~ ·\::;_;_;; t:d~:-!l', T>\(~ Riddl;;, o:f: !-lacArt:!l·Jr, (Ne~-;r York: 
Harper and Brothers, C.·l~p:-25~.. m ... 
21'';omac. R. J?hill 'lps, .. MacArthur the Soldier. 11 Newsweek, 
150: 16' J\pr; il 13' 1964. 
one important factor when wr ting of the 
general; the wor t thing that can happen 
to n army .an is to e promoted over the 
heads of enior officer , f or thi wa~ 
precisely what h ppened t o r~cArthur . 
'rhe general ' s rap! promotion , which caused him to 
become succes i vely the youngest off cer to command We t 
Point, then on to ecome the yo nge t 1'ajor G neral on 
active duty, and finally, when h 'l"las 50 years old, the 
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youngest man ever to be appointed to the office of Chief of 
Sta f of the Army, y 1av. · b en the source of some jealousy 
or re ent ent on the par· of; tl o e " jumped by !1acArthur . u4 
One exa: ple ca ou· du ing t he siege of ataan when 
rumors of a ~ashingtor1 s ll··ou t :r:e c hecl t e fighting men . 
Some thought that t l is was 1 pp r.d.ng bee se it was common 
knowle ge tt t ener 1 :r hall nd Ge eral Ma Arthur were 
not on goo erm ue to th spectacular rise of cArthur, 
a ter orld \~~ar I, to four car general nd Cliief of Staff 
while Mars~ a 1, on ly a ye r ytnmger, conti.nued in the r nk 
--"3 rank Kel ley and Corn liu y n , ~~~~ 
~t&on. , (N w Yor : Do11 lecla.y nd Compar~y, 
p. lOO . 
4George c. 
uell, Sloan, a.n 
nney , Th! ~~~.t~.h~u~r l &!?J:i• (New York: 
Pearce, · , p . 78 . 
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of lieutenant general. 5 
The fr:l.ct:I.ou \Jh:lch developed bet~veen I1acArthur and the 
Navy had pr<':~~Jated Uor:ld i· ar II. 'I'he diffe:cences which 
~.;,rorse between t:hc tn~anches of the ~::exv:lce~i afLt-:1~ th.~ disasters 
about ti1e deferuw o£ the Priillppines on the part of all 
bra:ncttes. T.w pre par~ i::lons t:or de fen so ~:ere not completed, 
and Air Force, r,/to 'jnd all underestimated the Japanese 
On Corre~.~idor t•te litu·ines developed a. suspicion that 
tlmy vrere not ',qe1J .. 1H~<'!d by the high eommand. They ~1ere 110t 
·ne'.L1t1oned in co<:tl!':\tt.n:Iques, tllld two days before NacArthur left 
for· Australia) 1Jnit citations ~"ere orde:t:ed fox· all e:{cept 
do tails to his Ghlef of Staf:i, ~neral Sutherland, w'1.10 let 
it be known that tb.is was no oversight for uthe Marines had 
gotten their sha:r.·e oi: the ]l'lory in Horli\ Hm~ I, and they 
stated: 
Ht:. Prcait~>~·l!.t, :l.f yo;1 pnn1tW 1::h:i.s polic.y 
~~~it:teL :dJ.l lefJfl h1~;::vit.!1.'.tl;• to h dt:T'~h~-
tion oi: d1t: {\~•1(;!1"tcan /~rr~.y, :f !1ave no eho:i.ce 
but tc oppOS2! you lJ<!I'l:~eL~'· ·;: ~;1 1 ,:::11 n::;': 
J:or r:1y i!tnlU:!diate relief no Ch:'l.cf of Staff 
and .. ::or 1Tt~.1:.4c :1m1t fro.1 -~;;~,~ tn: :·•y ~kt1 I 
shall t.'!kt,~ i:t\:7.1'; n.~:~ht st:ratl'~J. t:o the 
I 
people.') 
Pr·esident .7~ootwvel t d1.~oppco the prorot;e•.1 h1lr1gt·•t <:t1.tS. :) 
General AacA;: t;,ir.i: 1 ;; 
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old staff the general kept around him, and who many times 
did things in his name for which he received the blame. 
General Kenney stated: 
MacArthur's loyalty to those who are loyal 
to him and work for him 18 a wonderful 
trait. It marks the leader whose men trust 
him and follow him. In MacArthur'• caee it 
will even tolerate a degree of inefficiency. 
He cannot hurt a loyal friend. I believe 
that ia why he kept some people around, in 
spite of the fact that they were largely 
responsible for the bed press that he had 
during World War 11.10 
General Kenney went on to say that he looked •Jpon those 
who worked for him as ••cotnrades in arm.• •" aud that he 
would go to almost any extreme to look after and support 
them if difficulties aroae. 11 In past history this same 
type of loyalty eventually got General Ulysses s. Grant 
into serious difficulties. MacArthur stated of his staff 
that it "t;ras unsurpassed in excellence" and that "no 
commande-r was ever better aerved.nl2 
General Kenney has stated that the confusion and 
indecision prior to the Clark Field attack did "not sound 
MD • I!IIJt •. W ru rr:'i-M'C*,.,? -
Kenney, .22• cit;., p. 242. 
11Ibid. t p. 64. 
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-------------~- -- ------- -~12Doug-1-as-MacArthur~1-&Q!ini,aceneetL<lf~~YOJ:'Jc~! McGraw• Hill Book Company, 1964), P• 13. ----~-----~--~---~~~---~---------~--
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as though MacArthur had anything to do with the handling of 
the Air Force at that time . " He went on to say that the Air 
Force contact with MacArthur's Headquarters was General 
Sutherland, "who received recommendations for the use of 
the Air Force and who often rendered decisions in the name 
of General MacArthur."lJ 
The gener . l d an extreme sense of destiny. 
.M!lsazi,n,e stated: 
MacArthur envisioned himself a a child 
of destiny. r~ conceived nd fought 
monuntental battles w,i t h huge armies like 
Alexander, Caesar . and N poleon. He 
viewed his times and his own acts as 
decisive in history. His triumphs and 
his f ilurea often thrust him into 
whirh1inds of international controversy. 
14 • • • 
Time -
In 1940, in t he Philippines, Macklrthur told newsmen th t 
"it was d stiny that brought me her·e !"l5 This idea of 
destiny carried over to his staff as was shol~ when General 
Courtney tvbi tney mentioned that t hough it seemed that 
M.aeArthur•s final performance for posterity would be hts 
service in Jap n , now at '10 t he Korean War \\fSS .,Mars last 
13Kenney, .22. c,i t . , p. 83. 
14"Heroes MacArthur," Time8 tfaaa!f1ne , 83:24 , April 10, 
1964. 
15tbf.d - · 
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gift to an old warrior."16 
It is possible that false impressions about General 
MacArthur's attitude might have been due to American 
correspondants using the dateline "General MacArthur's 
Headquarters" over stories written in all parts of Australia 
on subjects ranging from "strategic pipedreams" to "jittery 
criticisms" of the conduct of the Pacific War. 17 This sort 
of thing continued throughout the geueral 1a career. The 
press was always watching what was done by someone in his 
position, especially one with the temperament and personal• 
ity of MacArthur. He complained, with clear justification, 
that reporters tended to tell the ttory of the war with its 
emphasis on casualtiel and the trauma of combat itself 
which distorted the overall picture.l8 
Many times the general would fly into a rage over 
press criticism and this only made matters worae. During 
the Japanese Occupation, Ambassador William Sebald stated 
15Harry B. Middleton, ~ ComtUlC£ Hi§tor:t of the 
Korean War, (New York: Hawthorn Book8 Inc., 1965): p. 99. 
17xrving Bryant, uTrut;h About MacArthur,"~ ReR!!bl,ic, 
107:851, December 14, 1942. 
18Middleton, ,g,n. e~t. • p. 9~~·~. 
·--~-·····~~~~ ~~~····~-~ 
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that he sometimes tried to tell MacArthur that routine 
reports were the normal procedure; but the general instead 
ordered Sebald to "have the State Department stop this 
criticism of the Occupation and SCAPl"19 The general just 
did not seem to realize that the pr ess i s free i n t he United 
States. 
The myth of MacArthur had grown during his lifetime 
and one of his most dominating characteristics contributed 
to it. This was his great ego. It was this ego that gave 
the general many useful as well as negative traits.20 This 
was demonstrated in an entry in the diary of Secretary of 
Defense James V. Forrestal: 
MacArthur never once referred to "the 
Americans," or "the Ja.panese," or to 
"our forces " or "their forces." Always 
it was "the enemy and I" or "he and I," 
so much that it left listeners wfth the 
impression of a tremendGus ego.2 
The general'a useful traits impressed many people. 
During World War II newsman Clark Lee stated: 
l9William J. Sebald, l.Jith Mae.Arthur .!!! Japan, }! 
Personal HiSts»rx of the Oecupat:~on, (New York: l~.t-1. Norton 
and Company, Inc., 1965), p. 112. 
20cunthur, ~· £!S., p. 23. 
+-------2-l-Entry-in--the-Bi-a.ry- o-f- Por-rea-ta-1,-Beb:J;-u&r-¥- 28_,- 19-45_,, ______ _ 
in Walter Millis (Ed.), 211~ F.orre~l!l !!!£1!!, (New York: 
The Viking Press, MacMillan Company, 1951), p. 26. 
there was MacArthur) soldier and a man 
of culture, whom some hated bee use he 
was both p~ophet and poet and a master of 
the Eng11 h language; who could tell you 
the details of every great b ttle in 
h1 tory; w _ e dee1 iv br in d gr t 
military knowledge should have been 
22 occupied in pl nning gre t battle • • • • 
General Wedemeyer at tedJ 
Wh never c'fte of MacArthur• report came 
into the War Plan• »1vf.4Jion, I was im• 
pre . · .ed with th sound · trategic concept 
behind his proposals . How often 1 wished 
that he could be in a position of 
authority in our government to help tht 
pl nn r of the Joint Chi f of St ·ff . Z3 
MacArthur tfa · disliked by . y, reapeet d by many, 
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d other gre tly loved and wex:e inspired by h1m. Gener 1 
Carlo ,mulo etat d that the gene2tal "aocomplished wba.t he 
did in the Philippine bee . u1e he kno~·rs how to select and 
inspire en. "24 
The extraordinary career of General Mae~thur raise• 
a great deal of hi t~rical speculation on the problems of 
civil•military relat:tonahips . Me wa - political general 
' 22c!' rk Lee • They Call jl !§p~gic • (New York : The 
iking Pres , 1943)• p . 234 . 
23Albert c. W demeyer , ~demexer 2orttJ, (New York: 
Henry Holt and Company., c ,. 1958)., p ~ 241 . 
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surrounded by controversy throughout his career. President 
Roosevelt had known this and it became evident in the 
differences between Harry Truman and MacArthur in the post• 
l<lar era. 25 In Korea, MacArthur had outlined a program 
which was completely unacceptable to his superiors and used 
hie prestige to enforce it. 26 
In looking at the personal qualities of MacArthur, it 
is poseible that inconsistencies were to be expected, for 
he l~d many times in World War 11, for example, announced 
victory while his troops faced the stiffest part of the 
battle. In Korea there was no excuse for the statements 
he began to make to certain people after tl~ failure of his 
November Offensive. ~Vi thin four days he was able to find 
four different ways to publish his views which made it 
quite plain that he or his staff were not to blame.27 There 
was also no excuse for the way the general made public his 
opposition to the admln:lstration•s policy in Korea. If 
I . 
there was to be criticiem, there '~re other wayl to carry 
,1 2.5"oavid Rees, Korea: !h!. Liptit;e,d r;1r, (London: 







Many things have had to be cons idered and placed 
together in order to get a picture of General MacArthur as 
a military l eader . Here we have a man who is driven by a 
tremendous ego which will not allow him to ever be wrong . 
He always had to be right. This led the general into 
verbal arguments with what he believed to be powerful 
enemies who opposed him. Many times t hese very arguments 
only made matters worse and led the general deeper into 
more controversy. 
The general had a great sense of loyalty to old 
friends . He kept around him a group of old friends who 
shielded him from critics and items which might upset him. 
The general in turn protected them. Many times t hese old 
friends made decisions in the general's name for which he 
received the blame . 
Another problem was the fact that MacArthur , during 
World War II and thereafter, served under men he once had 
under his command. Many times old rivalr ies entered the 
picture . 
The geq~_!' s .. whole_ -~.~-~e-~_1:' __ brings up the problem of 
-r----civ-i-1-ver~ military authority. He opposed President 
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Truman's European policy just as he l~d President Roosevelt's 
policy. The reas~a for MacArthur's lack of concern for 
Europe is clear from a statement he made during World War 11. 
In this statement he said: 
Europe is a dying system. It is worn out 
and run do\vn and will become an economic 
and industrial hegemony of Soviet Russia 
••• The hands touching the Pacific with 
their billions of inhabitants will deter-
mine the course of history for the next 
ten thousand years.28 
MacArthur continued his wartime opposition to the 
Europe-first strategy after the war. He maintained that 
th:te strategy "..ras inspired by Russia11 Communists.29 The 
general argued from a military standpoint, yet MacArthur 
himself at one time had stated: 
• • • No single departmental head, no 
matter what his particular function or 
title, could or ahould be responsible 
for the formulation of ••• dac1siona.30 
Thus the general had agreed with President Truman that 
wars were too serious a situation to be left in the hands of 
the gener ala. 
-- 2BJohn w. Spanier, .:!'..!'!!, Truman•ycArthu" Contrgver§:I 
ancl !!!!. !,<or~15 Wgr, <(New ~ork: W. W. Norton and Compax1y, 
lne. • c. l9u5 , p. ,,7 .. 
29lbid. J p. 69. 
30lbid.'. p. 238. -
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Dougla.s MacArth~Jr had faults and at times made tactical 
errors, but his place in history is firmly intrenched. 
AHli01'ATED BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Several of the sources used in this paper 1:;ere ~-rri tten 
by men who tfere close to General MacArthur. These men had 
a chance to nr-t only knOl-1 the general, but to observe his 
actions as "re11. One of these li74S newsman Clark Lee who 
writes of h:f.s observations of the general. Though the 
material i.n hf.e books Dou.sll!! Mae:Sth!:!I an<l :.!'~I Cf!ll! j! 
PJS1fl~ may not be completely objective, it is far from 
being completely in favor of MacArthur. Much of his 
material is of an eye-witness nature which discloses 
valuable military facts. William J. Sebald and Richard 
Brines, in their book Wi 1i,b. ~cArf;.i!Y.:! .!g dt~J?Jn, have 'tti tten 
a hiatory of MacArthur and the occupation of Japan. Mr. 
Sebalc:t, as amba~Jsador, t17&1 in a poeition to observe MacArthur 
well. This book is a first hand account of this period. 
Though Mr. Sebald sometimes ahows a little too much personal 
involvement, he does not aide completely with the general, 
The book contains stinging criticism of the general and 
bae mixed emotions about his programs. 
Severs.! of the secot1dary sourees ueed in this paper 
furni8h good critical material on MacArthur. Richard H. 
Rrivere andm Arthur Schl-e8:lngerJi:'-;-;1n-eneir bootrTtu;r~l,_ __ ··· -·······-······--
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.£;!l9 the President, t;ive an impat·t:i.al account of this contro-
subiect. ... Though they find ml.tch. to censure about 
the general, they also find much to praise. This book has 
facts to hack up the statements made and is a t~r:l.tical study 
l.rhieh attempts to nuti·::e sense out of legt~nfl. John \'7. Spanier, 
critical a.ccm.n:1t of this incident and po:i.nts out J..llany of the 
general's s~1ortcomings. 
The sources by Gouernl Carlos P. Rom.ulo are mainly 
of human interest raaterial. Even though a great: deal of the 
material in these booltB Sho'H sentimentality and hero ~YOrship, 
Romulo does not tx-y to gloss over shortcomings of the general. 
Th~ae books furnish important: in:for.mation twen though 
John Toland'o book But Not in Shame is on accurate ....,.....,..,. ................... , ........ 
account of the early stages of t:h.e Pacific \Jar. The author 
tends to po:f.nt up the h.uman element, and :f. a W'Xittexl ':!1\lCh 
l:ti-:e a novel. This source provides good doscripd.ve material 
though it generalizes a little too r.1uch. 
A few of che sources have a MacArthur bias. Frazier 
describes campaign.s well, but leavee out too many important 
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facts to be a definitive history of MacArthur. There is too 
muct:! :flattery used throughout the book. Francis Trevelyan 
Miller's book, .. _P.oua!!J...! ~-t~~ .U~sht:e~ J.at !£.~e~~~' also 
leaves out important filets and shows too much hero•'t7orship 
and praise. It :ta a good source if used for general des .. 
criptions only. General Charlea A. \dlloughby s.nd John 
Chamberlain, :tn their book .£1@pAr,t~··l:-lli.-.!?51_, give an 
account of MacArthur's activities during these years which 
1$ slanted heavily toward the general. Many unpleasant 
facts are left out and many times the facts used are die• 
tor. ted. Since the booJ< seems to be bia$e d, 1 t needs to be 
carefully weighe~. 
Many of the sources used in. this paper are general 
h!.4tor1es of World Har II and the Korean ~·!ar. They are 
mainly used for general descriptions. David Rees, the 
English historian and author of .!52£!!!: !!!! . .!J.mt£~ ~' 
gives an accurate and interesting account of military 
oporations in Korea. r~ also gives a clear and objective 
account of American command troubles in the Far Eaat. He 
points up problem.e ex:tstb1g between Washington and the 
American field c'Om.tnan~er. t-Jalter Karig and Manson Coyle 
uae4mmofficial --~:m:r.cet ·itt ~l:'ieir hook 1i,a~~~~ .~.Port: Th,e !.Ja_mm _______ _ 
142 
in K3r.ea. Because this was wr.ittan while the ~1ar was in ........... ~--.. 
pro;?:ress, it c.ontaiua some inaccuracies. This material 
supplemented th.e dEty to day reports given the newspapers. 
Frnn.I< o. H.ough' s book, 1'.!!! lsla-ru! War, furuishes excellent 
general descriptive ma.ter1.al of the events of \"orld War II. 
Though this source is :n..ainly based on the part the Marines 
played in the tvat·, it: is fair in its treatmeut of all 
branches of t'I1E'~ sGr~.rices. This book dral'lS on esseutial 
Japanese and An1er:tcan document• and seems to be quite 
factual. Robert Lect<ie's work, .. ~t;,;ona!!!!! ~d, furLdahes 
a clear, unriased history of the Korean War. Leckie was 
a cotnbat r!?.por.ter atid a former marine. He draws f1·om his 
own lcnowledge as tmll as other ·material for thia bluut, 
h1J.t fair, account. M. Hanlon Cannon'• book, .!:f3xte: ~ 
!,etux:n !+.'l -~ Phi!J..El!ines and Louis Morton's !!:!! iall ~ 
.t1~ !.!11t~·2J2~ne.@ are both based on offical government 
Sotrcces and are published by the Department ot' tne A:J."ill.y. 
These sour(~es co·nta.in excellent descriptions and iactli 
""£,.rhich are very ably presented by these authors. 
General nougla.s MacArthur's own Reminiscences B.l'e 
told as t:he general l·ranted them remembered. Many truths 
are omitted. Sometimes descriptions go beyond the 
military conception of strategy. The complete story is 
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not told, but the general gives credit where credit is due. 
This source is mainly used in this paper when direct 
quotations from MacArthur are needed. This book is written 
in cavalier fashion and there is a great correlation between 
the way MacArthur tells the story and the way it is told by 
Generals Whitney and Willoughby. 
A few of the sources used are commentaries and 
opinions from leading historians which are based on selected 
docmdentary material. Hanson w. Baldwin, the Military 
Editor of the .!!.!! Ygrk Times, in his work G'reat Mistakes .2! 
~ Wgr, gives a documented personal statement of conclusions 
from selected facts. Samuel Eliot Morison's worlt Strategy 
~ ~ompromise also states important conclusions. The 
reasoning behind these conclusions is sound and sometimes 
controversial. 
There are also sources used which are from collections 
of private papers or memoirs of important Washington 
officials and leaders. President Harry S. truman•s Memoirs 
give important facts which are necessary in discussing the 
war situation and General MacArthur. Truman's book tries 
to discredit critics and usually tells one side of the story. 
Nevertheless, important facts needed in this paper are 
Rosenman, 8ive 
important (acts eow::nrrd.nt: tho Prcsiderxt' s relationship \-'lith 
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